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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Article III, Section 1 of the Idaho Constitution reserves to the people the right of 
initiative-i.e., "the power to propose laws[] and enact the same at the polls independent of the 
legislature." In November 2002, Idaho citizens used this power to pass Proposition One, also 
known as the Tribal Gaming Initiative. The Initiative authorized compacts entered into between 
the State and federally recognized Indian tribes pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
("IGRA"), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721, to be amended to allow a compacted tribe to operate "tribal 
video gaming machines" subject to certain conditions. Section § 67-429B, Idaho Code, 
describes the permitted form of tribal video gaming machine, while the companion § 67-429C 
specifies the conditions and procedures for any tribe desiring to modify a compact to accept the 
Initiative's terms without further negotiation. 
The amended complaint here sought only one type of relief: a declaratory judgment that 
§§ 67-429B and -429C conflict with the gambling prohibition in Article III, Section 20 of the 
Idaho Constitution. The District Conrt dismissed the amended complaint on standing grounds 
because the requested declaratory relief would not redress the plaintiffs-appellants' alleged 
injury-in-fact-i.e., the availability of "slot machine" gaming at a casino near their residences 
operated under a compact between the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes and the State of Idaho. The 
court, however, declined to dismiss under I.R.C.P. 19 because of the amended complaint's failure 
to join as defendants the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes and three northern Idaho Indian tribes-the 
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Coeur d'Alene, Kootenai and Nez Perce Tribes-that offer the gaming daimed to be unlawful. 
II. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The complaint was filed on March 13, 2008. R. 003. The plaintiffs are two individuals 
(collectively "Knox") who reside near the Fort Hall Casino ("Casino"), a gaming facility 
operated by the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes ("SBT") on the Fort Hall Indian Reservation. R. 005 
1 8.a & b. Plaintiffs claim addiction to the "slot machine" gaming offered at the Casino and, 
additionally, that they "gambled almost exclusively [there] because of its very short distance 
from their respective residences" and that, "[ o ]f all the different types of gambling available 
[there], [they] played only the slot machines." R. 005 1 8.b & c. Plaintiffs state not only that 
they have lost substantial amounts of money as a result of this gambling and suffered emotional 
distress but also that one of them was convicted of a crime related to his efforts to acquire 
gambling funds. R. 005-006 1 8.d & e. The complaint named as defendants three Idaho 
statewide executive officers in their official capacities: the Governor, Secretary of State, and 
Attorney General (collectively "State Officials"). R.004113-5. 
The complaint contended that "[i]f the defendants had oi;iginally upheld the Idaho 
Constitution and statutes prohibiting slot machines against the Tribal Gaming Initiative and 
Idaho Code §§ 67-429B and 67-429C, slot machines would not have been installed at Fort Hall 
Casino and neither Plaintiff would have suffered [such] harm." R. 006 1 8.f. It further alleged 
that 
[i]f this Court declares Proposition One and LC. §§ 67-429B and 67-429C to be in 
violation of the Idaho Constitution, Fort Hall Casino will be forced to remove its slot 
machines, and such casino style gambling will be much less readily available to 
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Plaintiffs. This will make their recovery much easier and will prevent or minimize 
further harm to the Plaintiffs. 
R. 006 ,r 8.g. The complaint requested as relief a declaration that the two provisions are 
unconstitutional, an injunction against their enforcement, and an order requiring defendants "to 
uphold and enforce Article III, § 20 of the Idaho Constitution and Idaho Code §§ 18-3808 and 
18-3810." R. 008-009 ,r,r 1-3. 
The State Officials moved to dismiss under I.R.C.P. l2(b)(l), (6) and (7) on April 14, 
2008. R. 010-011. In the supporting brief, they argued in part that Knox had failed to join 
necessary and indispensable parties-the SBT and other Idaho tribes operating on-reservation 
gaming facilities (R. 026-033)-and that, even if standing existed, the District Court lacked 
authority to enter the requested injunctive relief to the extent that it would affect the Casino's 
operations (R. 033-044). The State Officials prefaced these arguments with a discussion of 
relevant standing principles and explained that "Idaho law, in agreement with federal law, has 
adopted a three-part standing analysis" requiring a complainant to establish an injury-in-fact, a 
causal connection between the challenged conduct and such injury, and "the availability of 
judicial relief that redresses the injury." R. 023-024. They also argued that this Court "has 
made clear that the injury alleged must be ... more than a generalized grievance shared by the 
public at large" and that the complaint's allegations sought "to avoid alleging a 'generalized 
grievance' shared by citizens at large over the claimed inconsistency of§§ 67-429B and -429C 
with Article III, Section 20" by characterizing Knox's injury-in-fact as the availability of "slot 
machine" gambling at the nearby Casino. R. 024. They stressed that these allegations "raise[ d] 
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substantial difficulties under the redressability prong of the standing test, since their asserted 
harm [could] be eliminated only by the SBT actually ceasing to operate [the purported slot] 
machines at the ... Casino" and that the use of those machines could "be affected only through 
modification of the SBT's gaming compact." Id. 
Knox responded in part to the State Officials' motion by filing the amended complaint. 
R. 140. It is substantively identical to the original except for modifying the title from 
"Complaint for Declaratory and Other Relief' to "Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief," 
substituting "may" for "shall" in paragraph 8.g, and deleting any requested relief other th1;U1 a 
declaratory judgment "that Idaho Code §§ 67-429B and 67-429C are unconstitutional, unlawful, 
and invalid under the prohibition on gambling contained in Article III, § 20 of the Idaho 
Constitution." R. 140, 143, 145. Knox emphasized repeatedly the limited nature of the relief 
sought in a simultaneously-filed memorandum opposing the motion. E.g., R. 128 ("[i]n their 
Amended Complaint the Plaintiffs do not request relief in the form of compelling the Defendants 
to take any specific action nor are they challenging or seeking to invalidate any tribal-state 
compact, but are merely seek [sic] a declaratory judgment"); R. 132 ("Plaintiffs are not asking 
this Court to prevent the government or any other entity from forming a compact with a tribe nor 
are they attacking the compact entered into between the government and the tribe"); R. 134 
("Plaintiffs are not seeking injunctive or mandamus relief. They are not directly challenging, 
attacking, or seeking to rescind any tribal compacts"); id. ("Plaintiffs have not requested that the 
Court impose any obligations at all on the defendants; the amended complaint seeks only 
declaratory relief, not mandatory relief'). She conceded that "[i]t is at best unclear whether the 
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state of Idaho would be successful in a possible future attempt to avoid the tribal compacts if this 
Court grants Plaintiffs their requested declaratory judgment." Id. ( emphasis added). 
Against this backdrop, the District Court entered an order on September 22, 2008, 
granting the State Officials' motion to dismiss. R. 187. It entered an attendant judgment 
dismissing the amended complaint with prejudice on September 25, 2008. R. 204. The court 
deemed the motion subject to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standards (R. 191) and held that the 
declaratory judgment relief sought by Knox would not redress her claimed injury (R. 198-202). 
It thus agreed with the State Officials that she must establish standing to maintain the action and 
that, to do so, she "must 'allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that 
the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury."' R. 198. Here, however, 
"should the Plaintiffs attain the ultimate relief they seek, then the Tribe and the State will fall 
back upon their Compact, which allows the Tribe to operate any gaming activity that the State 
permits for any purpose by any person, organization or entity." R. 201. In this regard, the 
District Court reasoned that the Tribe or Idaho might request the compact' s renegotiation or 
initiate federal court proceedings over the validity of the involved machine gaming but viewed 
those possibilities as constituting "a question of interpretation of the Compact" not before it. Id. 
"[H]ighly speculative," in the court's view, was "[w]hether or not the State will seek to pass 
other legislation[] or to amend the Idaho Constitution." Id. Since the court deemed itself 
foreclosed from "speculat[ing] as to the outcome" of these various alternatives, "[a] declaration 
that LC. § 67-429B and § 67-429C are unconstitutional does not ... rid the Plaintiffs of the 
proximity of the slot machines to which they claim to be addicted." R. 201-202. 
5 
Prior to discussing the standing issue, the District Court rejected the State Officials' 
contention that the SBT and other Idaho gaming tribes were indispensable parties under Rule 19 
because "[t]he Plaintiffs do not seek, by this action, to enjoin the use of tribal video gaming 
machines by all of the Indian tribes in ... Idaho" or to invalidate the SBT's gaming compact. R. 
196. The court declined to "speculate as to how the State would ultimately proceed" were the 
requested declaratory relief entered. Id. It saw no risk of inconsistent obligations absent the 
tribes' joinder, since "[a]ny additional action by the State, necessitated by a finding of 
unconstitutionality, would be consistent with the finding of constitutionality, rather than 
inconsistent therewith." R. 197. The District Court, in sum, considered the tribes outside the 
reach of indispensability status "[f]or the same reasons" that "the Plaintiffs cannot show that a 
favorable conclusion to their lawsuit would redress their injuries." R. 200. Finally, the court 
found Knox's claim not preempted by IGRA because it did not fall within those for which 
federal court jurisdiction is provided under 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A). R. 197-198. 
III. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Resolution of this appeal turns in large measure on the provisions of IGRA and the 
statute's application to the four tribes with "Indian lands" located in Idaho on which class III 
gaming under IGRA is conducted pursuant to a tribal-state compact. A concise discussion of 
IGRA's core elements and that application follows. 
Congress enacted IGRA in 1988 to regulate gaming by federally recognized tribes on 
"Indian lands." Pub. L. No. 100-487, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168 
& 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721). Those lands include Indian reservations. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(4). 
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IGRA separates gaming into three classes and imposes differing regulatory requirements as to 
each. Id. §§ 2703(6)-(8), § 2710(a), (b) & (d); see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 48-50 
(1996) (summarizing IGRA's regulatory scheme). "Class III gaming" is a residual category for 
all gambling activity not encompassed by the class I and class II gaming categories. 25 U.S.C. 
§ 2703(8). Class III gaming includes lotteries or electronic facsimiles oflotteries and most forms 
of machine-related gambling, including slot machines and more modem electronic or 
electromechanical facsimiles of any game of chance. See, e.g., 25 C.F.R. §§ 502.7, 502.8 
(National Indian Gaming Commission regulations defining, respectively, an "electronic, 
computer or other technologic aid" deemed part of class II gaming and an "electronic or 
electromechanical facsimile" deemed class III gaming). 
IGRA allows class III gaming to be conducted only pursuant to a tribal-state compact 
affirmatively approved by the Secretary of the Interior ("Secretary"), pursuant to a tribal-state 
compact not disapproved by the Secretary within 45 days of submission for approval, or pursuant 
to "procedures" adopted by the Secretary under circumstances that have not occurred in Idaho. 
25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii) & 2710(d)(8). The Secretary may disapprove a compact for 
several reasons, among which is a determination that the agreement violates a provision of 
IGRA. Id.§ 2710(d)(8)(B)(i). The statute, inter alia, restricts class III gaming activities to those 
which are "located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, 
organization, or entity." Id.§ 2710(d)(l)(B). 
Between 1992 and 2000, Idaho Governors entered into class III gaming compacts on the 
State's behalf with four of the five Idaho tribes: the Coeur d'Alene Tribe, the Kootenai Tribe, the 
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Nez Perce Tribe, and the SBT. 1 Each compact was approved affirmatively by the Secretary. See 
58 Fed. Reg. 8478 (Feb. 12, 1993) (Coeur d'Alene Tribe compact approval notice); 58 Fed. Reg. 
59,926 (Nov. 10, 1993) (Kootenai Tribe compact approval notice); 60 Fed. Reg. 57,246 
(Nov. 14, 1995) (Nez Perce Tribe compact approval notice); 65 Fed. Reg. 54,541 (Sept. 8, 2000) 
(SBT compact approval notice). Three compact modifications additionally were approved by the 
Secretary in 2003 when the Coeur d'Alene, Kootenai and Nez Perce Tribes exercised their rights 
under the voter-approved Tribal Gaming Initiative, which did not require gubernatorial or 
legislative action, following submission to the Idaho Secretary of State in accordance with the 
Initiative's requirements. 68 Fed. Reg. 1068 (Jan. 8, 2003) (Coeur d'Alene Tribe compact 
addendum approval notice); 68 Fed. Reg. 1068 (Jan. 8, 2003) (Kootenai Tribe compact 
amendment approval notice); 68 Fed. Reg. 1068 (Jan. 8, 2003) (Nez Perce Tribe compact 
addendum approval notice). See R. 053-065.2 
In relevant part, § 67-429B authorizes the use of "tribal video gaming machines" by an 
1 Section § 67-429A, Idaho Code, contains the current state-law framework governing the process of negotiating 
gaming compacts with tribes. Originally enacted in 1993 (1993 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 408), the statute authorizes the 
Governor to represent the State in such negotiations but imposes several limits within which that authority must be 
exercised. One of those limits is a requirement that the forms of gaming in the compact be permitted under Idaho 
law. Idaho Code§ 67-429A(2)(a). If any of those limits are not complied with, express ratification by concurrent 
resolution of both legislative houses is necessary. Id. § 67-429A(3). The SBT compact, however, was ratified by a 
separate statute that additionally waived Idaho's immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States 
Constitution with respect to litigation contemplated under the compact. 2000 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 220. The 
legislature had enacted a similar waiver for earlier compact-related litigation with the Coeur d'Alene Tribe. 
1993 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 367; see Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, 842 F. Supp. 1268 (D. Idaho 1994), aff'd per 
memo., 51 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. 1996). 
2 A pre-election challenge to the Tribal Gaming Initiative's constitutionality was dismissed on standing and ripeness 
grounds. In re Petition to Determine Constitutionality of Indian Gaming Initiative, 137 Idaho 798, 53 P.3d 1217 
(2002) ("Indian Gaming Initiative"). A post-election challenge filed before this Court also was dismissed because 
the Court lacked original jurisdiction. In re Petition to Determine Constitutionality of Idaho Code Sections 67-429B 
and 67-429C, No. 29226 (Idaho S. Ct. June 2, 2003) (order dismissing petition), reh'g denied (Oct. 16, 2003). R. 
068-070, 072. 
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Indian tribe if specifically allowed under a tribal-state compact and if compliant with certain 
technical criteria identified in subsection (I). It further declares in subsection (2) that a § 67-
429B-authorized machine "is not a slot machine or an electronic or electromechanical imitation 
or simulation of any form of casino gambling" under Idaho law. Section 67-429C sets out a 
procedure allowing a tribe to amend an existing compact to provide for gaming through these 
machines by filing with the Secretary of State a resolution "signifying [its] acceptance" of 
several conditions. Id § 67-429C(2). Those conditions include limitations on the permissible 
number of machines, contributions of five percent of "annual net gaming revenue for the support 
of local educational programs and schools on or near the reservation[,]" and agreement "not to 
conduct gaming outside oflndian lands." Id.§ 67-429C(l)(b)-(c).3 
The SBT followed a different course to offer gambling through tribal video gaming 
machines. Its class III compact with Idaho authorized "any gaming activity that the State of 
Idaho 'permits for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity,' as the phrase is interpreted 
in the context of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act." R. 080 § 4.a. The SBT compact allowed 
either or both parties to file an "initial declaratory judgment action" in United States district court 
to determine "what gaming the Tribes may conduct under the Act and what restrictions on the 
operations, if any, may be imposed by the State." R. 08 I § 5. The SBT contended that it was 
"entitled to offer and regulate all forms of gaming except sports-better" because "[g]iven the 
range and scope of gaming activities [ under Idaho law J, with an emphasis on a multi-faceted 
3 Section § 67-429C(3) permits any tribe to negotiate "for an initial compact or a compact amendment regarding 
tribal video gaming machines or any other matter through a procedure other than the procedure specified ·in 
subsection (2) above or which contains terms different than those specified in subsection ( 1) above." 
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state-sponsored entity, the State of Idaho cannot establish that any gaming activity, properly 
regulated to ensure the integrity of the game and protect the gaming patron, contravenes the State 
ofldaho's public policy for gaming" and that "in light of traditional understandings of the context 
. and legislative history of [IGRA ], the State cannot establish that it has reasonably characterized 
the relevant state laws as completely prohibiting a distinct form of gaming." R. 079 § 3.q. The 
State, however, disagreed and argued that "the only tribal Class III gaming activities ... legal in 
Idaho under federal law are those Class III gaming activities permitted by article 3, section 20 of 
the Idaho Constitution and not otherwise contrary to the criminal laws of ... Idaho." Id. § 3. o. 
The SBT and the State filed separate declaratory judgment actions in 200 I in the United 
States District Court for the District ofldaho, which were then consolidated. Shoshone-Bannock 
Tribes v. Idaho, No. CV-01-052-E-BLW (D. Idaho); Idaho v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 
No. CV-01-171-E-BLW (D. Idaho). Following passage of the Tribal Gaming Initiative and 
Secretarial approval of the modifications to the Coeur d'Alene, Kootenai and Nez Perce 
compacts, the consol~dated action's focus narrowed to whether the SBT compact, most 
particularly its most-favored-nation provision, allowed the SBT to offer gambling through tribal 
video gaming machines as identified in § 67-429B without compliance with the conditions 
specified in§ 67-429C(l).4 The federal district court said yes. R. 108. It held that Section 4 of 
the compact encompassed the newly-authorized tribal video gaming machines, since such 
gaming was being conducted by other tribes, and construed Section 24.d as "merely [an] 
4 Section 24.d of the SBT compact provides in part that "[i]n the event any other Indian tribe is permitted by 
compact or final court decision to conduct any Class III games in Idaho in addition to those games permitted by this 
Compact, this Compact shall be amended to permit the Tribes to conduct those same additional games." 
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administrative provision[] requiring the Tribe to serve upon the Idaho State. Gaming Counsel a 
brief amendment clarifying that that Tribe is authorized to operate tribal video gaming 
machines." R. 121-122. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment but gave the 
compact a somewhat different reading. Idaho v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 465 F.3d 1095 (9th 
Cir. 2006). It construed Section 24.d as "leav[ing] no room for negotiation" because "it 
. mandates an amendment to permit one thing-the operation of the same games conducted by 
other tribes under their compacts." Id at 1099. The court of appeals rejected Idaho's position 
that Section 24.d required the SBT to adhere to the conditions contained in § 67-429C and 
accepted by the other Idaho tribes. Id at 1101 (while "[t]he other tribes agreed to accept the 
statutory package of amendments that were not included in their compacts[,]" the SBT "chose 
instead to rely on [its] Compact's existing provisions to confer the necessary permission to 
operate the video gaming machines"). The SBT thus was "entitled to a mandatory amendment of 
the Compact stating that [it is] authorized to conduct tribal video gaming." Id at 1102. The 
State did not contest the validity of the Tribal Gaming Initiative before either the district court or 
the Ninth Circuit. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Whether Knox possesses standing to seek a declaratory judgment concemmg the 
constitutionality of Idaho Code §§ 67-429B and -429C where that relief will not result in 
cessation of the gaming activity alleged to cause her injury-in-fact. 
II. Whether the SBT and the three other Idaho tribes authorized by federal law-sanctioned 
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compacts to operate tribal video gaming machines at their reservation gambling facilities are 
necessary and indispensable parties under LR. C.P. 19. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The general standard for determining motions_ under l.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) is the same as 
under I.R.C.P. 56. Gallagher v. State, 141 Idaho 665, 668, 115 P.3d 756, 759 (2005). This 
Court, like district courts, thus must "view[] all facts and inferences from the record in favor of 
the non-moving party ... [and) ask whether a claim for relief has been stated," since "[t]he issue 
is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the party is 'entitled to offer 
evidence to support the claims."' Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 136 Idaho 63, 67, 28 P.3d 
1006, 1010 (2001); accord Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 673, 183 P.3d 758, 761 (2008); 
Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002). The Court, however, 
may consider matters of public record susceptible of judicial notice at any stage of a proceeding. 
I.RE. 201(f); see Crawford v. Dep't of Corrections, 133 Idaho 633,636 n.l, 991 P.2d 358, 361 
n.1 (1999); cf Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[a] court may take 
judicial notice of 'matters of public record' without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion 
for summary judgment"). Questions concerning the proper interpretation of constitutional or 
statutory provisions that may be raised by such motions are, as well, subject to free review. 
Moreland v. Adams, 143 Idaho 687, 689, 152 P.3d 558, 560 (2007); Osmunson v. State, 
135 Idaho 292, 294, 17 P.3d 236, 238 (2000). District court disposition of motions under 
I.R.C.P. 12(b)(7) are subject to review under the abuse-of-discretion standard. Utter v. Gibbins, 
137 Idaho 361, 366, 48 P.3d 1250, 1255 (2002). Lastly, "[a) cross-appeal is required only when 
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the respondent seeks to change or add to the relief afforded below, but not when it merely seeks 
to sustain a judgment for reasons presented at trial which were not relied upon by the trial judge 
but should have been." Walker v. · Shoshone County, 112 Idaho 991, 993, 739 P.2d 290, 
292 (1987); accord Driver v. SI Corp., 139 Idaho 423,427, 80 P.3d 1024, 1028 (2003). 
ARGUMENT 
I. KNOX LACKS STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
IDAHO CODE §§ 67-429B AND -429C WHERE THE ONLY RELIEF SOUGHT-
A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT CONCERNING THOSE STATUTES' 
CONSTITUTIONALITY UNDER ARTICLE III, SECTION 20-WILL NOT 
RESULT IN THE CESSATION OF "SLOT MACHINE" GAMING AT THE 
CASINO AND THEREBY REMOVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO GAMBLE ON 
THOSE MACHINES 
A. General Standing Principles And Knox's Dilemma 
I. This Court has held often that a litigant must possess standing to invoke judicial 
intervention. Idaho law follows federal precedent and applies a three-part standing analysis. As 
the Court explained almost two decades ago in the seminal Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 
635, 778 P.2d 757 (1989), two of the three considerations are injury-in-fact and causation: 
"The essence of the standing inquiry is whether the party seeking to invoke the court's 
jurisdiction has 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to 
assure the concrete adversariness which sharpens the presentation upon which the court 
so depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.' As refined by 
subsequent reformation, this requirement of 'personal stake' has come to be understood 
to require not only a 'distinct palpable injury' to the plaintiff, but also a 'fairly traceable' 
causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct." 
116 Idaho at 641, 778 P.2d at 763 (quoting Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 
438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978) (citations omitted)). The injury alleged must be specific to the 
complainant and, therefore, more than a generalized grievance shared by the public at large-i. e., 
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"a concerned citizen who seeks to ensure the government abides by the law does not have 
standing." Miles, 116 Idaho at 641, 778 P.2d at 763; accord Koch v. Canyon County, 145 Idaho 
158, 160, 177 P.3d 372,374 (Idaho 2008). 
Aside from a non-generalized injury-in-fact caused by the defendant, the standing 
doctrine imposes on the complainant the obligation to identify the availability of judicial relief 
that redresses the injury. The Miles Court made clear that the redressability prong of the 
standing doctrine cannot be satisfied by speculation or hope. Rather, "litigants generally must 
allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief 
requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury"-a standard which this Court reiterated in 
subsequent decisions. 116 Idaho at 641, 778 P.2d at 763 (emphasis added) (citing Duke Power 
Co. v. Carolina Envt'l Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 79 (1978)); see, e.g., Taylor v. Maile, 
No. 33781, 2009 WL 213072, at *2 (Idaho S. Ct. Jan. 30, 2009); Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 
767, 772, 133 P.3d 1232, 1237 (2006). Existence of each element of standing-injury-in-fact, 
causation and redressability-is a jurisdictional prerequisite and constitutes a "preliminary 
question to be determined by [a] Court before reaching the merits of the case." Young, 137 Idaho 
at 104, 44 P.3d at 1159; cf Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1998) 
(rejecting Ninth Circuit's "'hypothetical jurisdiction"' approach under which it was deemed 
"proper to proceed immediately to the merits question, despite jurisdictional objections, at least 
where (I) the merits question is more readily resolved, and (2) the prevailing party on the merits 
would be the same as the prevailing party were jurisdiction denied"). 
2. Knox predicated the requisite non-generalized injury-in-fact through her alleged 
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compulsive gambling at the Casino. She thus initially asked the District Court to facilitate 
management of her gambling addiction by entering injunctive relief whose effect would have 
been the elimination of "slot machines" near her home. Knox's attempted end-run around a 
"generalized· grievance" through this quite specific relief nevertheless created substantial 
difficulties not only in terms of the relief that actually could be entered by the District Court-
i.e., whether the complaint stated a claim for Rule l 2(b )( 6) purposes-but also with regard to the 
need to join the SBT and the other Idaho gaming tribes as defendants, given the potential 
prejudice to their compact-based entitlement to operate tribal video gaming machines. The State 
Officials raised both issues in arguing for the original complaint's dismissal. R. 026-044. 
Knox attempted to negate any indispensable party and remedial authority concerns 
through amendments to the complaint that limited the requested relief to a simple declaratory 
judgment concerning the validity of§§ 67-429B and -429C and replacing "will" with "may" in 
paragraph 8.g of the pleading. R. 140, 143, 145. The amendments, however, brought to the 
forefront the redressability-and hence standing-concerns identified by the State Officials in 
their brief. See R. 023-025. Knox thus moved from one untenable position-seeking 
termination of the "slot machine" gaming at the Casino as a form of judicial relief-to another 
untenable one-seeking only a declaratory judgment that, even if granted, would leave the 
gaming in place and thereby not eliminate the cause of the asserted injury-in-fact. She was 
caught, in short, on the horns of an insoluble dilemma. 5 
5 An arguable pleading consequence of the amendment was to alter the focus of remedial authority issue identified 
in the State Officials' brief from primarily a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge-whether the District Court possessed the 
authority to enter the requested relief-to whether the requested relief, if entered, would redress her alleged injury-
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The same dilemma pervades Knox's opening brief before this Court_. She retreats from 
her statements before the District Court that she was not "attacking the compact entered into 
between the govermnent and the tribe" and that "[i]t is at best unclear whether the state of Idaho 
would be successful in a possible future attempt to avoid the tribal compacts if this Court grants 
Plaintiffs their requested declaratory judgment." R. 134. Knox now argues that "the gaming 
purportedly allowed under the Compact . . . is prohibited by Article III § 20 of the Idaho 
Constitution" and that the compact is therefore not binding on the State because it "is illegal, 
void, and a nullity from its inception." Appellant's Br. 19; see also id. 23 ("[o]nce the 
declaratory judgment is entered that § 67-429B and § 67-429C are unconstitutional, those 
statutes would then create no liability, and afford no protection-they are simply void and 
without effect"). Indeed, Knox contends that the illegality is so clear that "[i]f ... any further 
litigation with the tribes or other action were required in the event the requested declaratory 
judgment were granted, the result would be a foregone conclusion." Appellant's Br. 19. She 
in-fact-a jurisdictional issue properly the province of Rule 12(b)(l). Nonetheless, insofar the distinction between 
redressability and substantive remedial authority is often indefinite, so too is whether Rule 12(b)(l) or Rule 12(b)(6) 
applies as a. technical procedural matter. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability 
and Remedies-And Their Connection to Substantive Rights, 92 Va. L. Rev. 633, 683, 689 (2006) (discussing "the 
Equilibration Thesis-which holds that justiciability, substantive, and remedial doctrines are substantially 
interconnected and that courts frequently face a choice about which doctrine to adjust in order to achieve acceptable 
results overall[,]" and arguing, with suits against governmental entities or officers as an illustration, that "the 
[Supreme] Court treats justiciability, substantive, and remedial doctrines as distinct, but its decisions about how to 
frame those doctrines are by no means cabined off from one another"). That the District Court deemed the motion 
to dismiss appropriate for resolution under Rule 12(b)(6) rather than Rule 12(b)(l) with respect to the standing issue 
is thus unremarkable generally and immaterial as a procedural matter because of the otherwise common standards of 
review. R. 191; see Gallagher, 141 Idaho at 667-68, 115 P.3d at 758-59 (Rule 12(b)(6) standards applied as to 
standing challenge). The amended complaint did render moot the State Officials' IGRA-based preemption 
challenge-R. 033-043-which was directed to the scope of the District Court's remedial authority to enter 
injunctive relief that would require them to take action to effect prosecution for "slot machine" use at the Casino or 
to alter the SBT compact, not to its remedial power to determine the constitutionality of§§ 67-429B and -429C 
under Article Ill, Section 20 if Knox had standing. 
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concludes from these premises that "the requested declaratory judgment would redress [her] 
injuries because it would void as plainly illegal the tribal gaming Compact, resulting in the video 
slot machines being prohibited by IGRA." Id 
Knox cannot have it both ways. She may not portray the declaratory relief sought as, on 
one hand, not "attacking" the SBT's or the northern Idaho tribes' compacts but, on the other, 
rendering those agreements void from their inception. Her newly-coined arguments concerning 
redressability founder in any event when the amended complaint's allegations are measured 
against applicable pleading standards and the actual legal effect of the declaratory relief. 
B. Failure To Plead Facts Showing Substantial Likelihood Of Redress Through 
The Requested Declaratory Relief 
1. The central allegation in the amended complaint with respect to redressability 
appears in paragraph 8.g: 
If this Court declares Proposition One and LC. §§ 67-429B and 67-429C to be in 
violation of the Idaho Constitution, Fort Hall Casino may be forced to remove its slot 
machines, and such casino style gambling will be much less readily available to 
Plaintiffs. This will make their recovery easier and will prevent or minimize further 
harm to the Plaintiffs of the kind set forth above. 
R. 143. The term "Fort Hall Casino" means, necessarily, the SBT since it owns the Casino and 
operates it pursuant to the IGRA-sanctioned compact. Use of the permissive "may" in lieu of the 
original complaint's "will" reflects the fact that the requested declaratory judgment itself will not 
result in the cessation of the "slot machine" gaming. Additional action on the SBT's part-
whether voluntary or involuntary-instead must occur for redress of Knox's injury-in-fact. Her 
brief suggests two possible scenarios in this regard: "[I]t may be necessary for the State to raise 
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this issue in federal district court once the requested declaratory judgment is entered" 
(Appellant's Br. 20), and action against the SBT by "the federal authorities responsible for 
prosecuting illegal gaming" (id. 23 ). Both scenarios tum on the proposition that "this Court is 
entitled to expect that [the federal and state governments] will follow the law." Id. Neither the 
brief nor the amended complaint suggests that the SBT itself would agree to terminate use of 
tribal video gaming machines in response to a declaratory judgment finding §§ 67-429B and -
429C inconsistent with Article III, Section 20. 
The United States Supreme Court established the basic parameters of redressability 
analysis governing here in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992): 
When the suit is one challenging the legality of government action or inaction, 
the nature and extent of facts that must be averred (at the summary judgment stage) or 
proved (at the trial stage) in order to establish standing depends considerably upon 
whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the action ( or forgone action) at issue .... 
When ... a plaintiffs asserted injury arises from the government's allegedly unlawful 
regulation ( or lack of regulation) of someone else, much more is needed. In that 
circumstance, causation and redressability ordinarily hinge on the response of the 
regulated ( or regulable) third party to the government action or inaction-and perhaps on 
the response of others as well. The existence of one or more of the essential elements of 
standing "depends on the unfettered choices made by independent actors not before the 
courts and whose exercise of broad and legitimate discretion the courts cannot presume 
either to control or to predict," ... and it becomes the burden of the plaintiff to adduce 
facts showing that those choices have been or will be made in such marmer as to 
produce causation and permit redressability of injury .... Thus, when the plaintiff is not 
himself the object of the government action or inaction he challenges, standing is not 
precluded, but it is ordinarily "substantially more difficult" to establish. 
Id. at 561-62 (citations omitted). Knox's claim fits the Lujan paradigm because it does not 
address regulation imposed upon her-none exists-but, rather, seeks to alter the relationship 
between Idabo and the SBT. Also fitting that paradigm is the fact that, as explained below, 
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nothing in the requested judgment or the broader legal landscape compels the State Officials or 
the federal government to take any action in pursuit of objectives that would redress Knox's 
purported injury. The question therefore becomes whether the amended complaint shows "a 
substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury" 
as both the Supreme Court and this Court demand in controversies where the complainant herself 
challenges the effect of regulation imposed on a third party. See Miles, 116 Idaho ·at 638, 778 
P .2d at 760 (ratepayer suit over legislation alleged to inflate electric power costs by using a 
utility's "rate base (for facilities) that no longer exists or is substantially diminished in value"). 
2. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has issued several post-Lujan 
decisions that, taken together, provide a helpful framework for examining the "substantial 
likelihood" issue. In US Ecology, Inc. v. USDOI, 231 F.3d 20 (D.C. Cir. 2000), the court held 
that a developer, as the State of California's licensee, of a proposed low-level radioactive waste 
site lacked standing to challenge the Department of the Interior's rescission of an order that 
authorized the site's sale to California. The developer's appeal followed an adverse summary 
judgment ruling against both it and California, with the latter electing not to appeal. Nothing in 
the record established that California, at least as of the time of the appeal, would accept the land 
transfer or proceed forward with the site's construction. Id. at 21, 24, 25. In concluding that the 
developer lacked standing, the court of appeals reasoned that " [ c ]ourts have been loath to find 
standing when redress depends largely on policy decisions yet to be made by government 
officials ... 'whose exercise of broad and legitimate discretion the courts cannot presume either 
to control or to predict.'" Id. at 24-25 (quoting ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 615 
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(1989)); see also Miami Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Sec'y, 493 F.3d 201, 206 (D.C. Cir. 
2007) (following US Ecology to find lack of redressability where labor group and developer 
challenged Department of Defense determination not to convey land to a county for airport 
development, since only the county '"is capable of accepting title and taking ownership of the 
land"' and "[w]hat [the county's] decision would be if offered-as originally-the full (acreage] 
to i.onstruct an airport is beyond the court's control or ken"). 
The court of appeals blazed the path begun in US Ecology through formulation of a two-
part test to resolve "substantial likelihood" issues in National Wrestling Coaches Association v. 
Department of Education, 366 F.3d 930 (D.C. Cir. 2004). There, a group sought to set aside an 
agency's policy interpretations under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 1681-1688, and implementing regulations, which allegedly had a negative impact on 
intercollegiate men's wrestling programs by diverting resources to women's sports programs. 
Neither the statute nor the regulations themselves, however, were attacked. The court found a 
lack of standing, observing at the outset of its substantive analysis that "Appellants do not 
suggest that any particular school necessarily would forego elimination of a wrestling team or 
reinstate a previously disbanded program in the absence of these interpretive rules, except to say 
that Marquette University 'might bring back its wrestling program if the legal requirements 
changed."' 366 F.3d at 939. It noted in this regard the statement at oral argument by the group's 
counsel "that, if his clients prevail, appellants think they may have 'better odds' of retaining their 
desired wrestling programs" but cautioned that "a quest for ill-defined 'better odds' is not close to 
what is required to satisfy the redressability prong of Article III." Id. 
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The National Wrestling court then distilled from pnor cases a two-part analytical 
framework for resolving redressability issues where ameliorative conduct by a nonparty is 
necessary: 
We recognize that courts occasionally find the elements of standing to be 
satisfied in cases challenging government action on the basis of third-party conduct. 
These cases fall into two easily distinguishable categories. First, a federal court may 
find that a party has standing to challenge government action that permits or authorizes 
third-party conduct that would otherwise be illegal in the absence of the Government's 
action .... [1) Second, some cases have held that plaintiffs have standing to challenge 
government action on the basis of injuries caused by regulated third parties where the 
record presented substantial evidence of a causal relationship between the government 
policy and the third-party conduct, leaving little doubt as to causation and the likelihood 
ofredress. 
Id. at 940-41. Invalidating the interpretative policy pronouncements would not have placed the 
group into either category, since "appellants fall far short of establishing the requisite likelihood 
that the educational institutions whose choices lie at the root of appellants' alleged injuries will 
behave any differently with respect to men's wrestling if appellants prevailed on the merits and 
secured their requested relief' (id. at 940); i.e., "the possibility that their members may have 
'better odds' ofretaining their desired wrestling programs plainly falls far short of the mark set by 
[relevant precedent] .... [which) require[ s) 'formidable evidence' of causation" (id. at 942). 
The court of appeals applied National Wrestling's analytical scheme in Renal Physicians 
Association v. USDHHS, 489 F.3d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2007), where a physician group challenged 
adoption of "safe harbor" method for calculating fair-market-value rate for certain services as 
noncompliant with the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 501-551, 701-706, 
even though the rate could be shown by other methods. It reasoned in part: 
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We see National Wrestling as standing for two simple points, neither of which 
constitutes a shift in the law of standing, but both of which doom RP A's claim of 
standing here. First, although less is required to survive a motion to dismiss than a 
motion for summary judgment, National Wrestling makes clear that a bald allegation of 
standing is not enough to survive even a motion to dismiss where neither the factual 
allegations nor their logic establish redressability .... Second, National Wrestling 
confirms that causation does not inevitably imply redressability .... There might be 
some circumstances in which governmental action is a substantial contributing factor in 
bringing about a specific harm, but the undoing of the ·governmental action will not 
undo the harm,' because the new status quo is held in place by other forces. That was 
the case in National Wrestling, where the independent desire of colleges to balance their 
athletic programs worked to hold in place changes that might have been influenced at 
the outset by the Department of Education's policies .... Likewise, that is the case here, 
where the independent choice of the dialysis facilities, seeking to keep costs down and 
avoid the risks of litigation, will hold in place the alleged effect of the safe harbor even 
if a court were to invalidate the safe harbor. 
489 F.3d 1278 (citations omitted). "In sum," the court stated, the physicians' group "has not 
satisfied the redressability prong of the standing requirement, because it has not alleged any facts 
showing that an order invalidating the safe harbor will likely cause dialysis facilities to increase 
the wages of RPA members." Id.; see also Emergency Coalition to Defend Educ. Travel v. 
United States Dep't of Treasury, 545 F.3d 4, 10-11 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (relying primarily on letter 
from provost of nonparty university requesting reconsideration of Cuba travel ban and the 
absence of any indication that university's position had altered to establish requisite 
redressability in professor's suit to invalidate ban; distinguishing National Wrestling and Renal 
Physicians). 
3. There can be no legitimate dispute that the amended complaint here, when 
measured against the National Wrestling criteria, fails to allege a "substantial likelihood" of the 
SBT's ceasing to operate tribal video game machines at the Casino should the requested 
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declaratory relief enter. First, a declaration of §§ 67-429B and -429C's inconsistency with 
Article III, Section 20 will not render the "slot machine" gaming at the Casino illegal. The 
injury-in-fact claimed by Knox instead derives from operation of the Casino's tribal video 
gaming machines pursuant to the terms of a federal law-sanctioned gaming compact. Second, 
she pursues a theory-i. e., entry of the requested relief will prompt the State Officials or, 
conceivably, the federal government to seek elimination of tribal video gaming machines 
throughout Idaho-which "is not merely speculative-it is positively chimerical." Biszko v. 
RIHT Fin. Corp., 758 F.2d 769, 773 (1st Cir. 1985). 
a. A determination that the gambling activity permitted under §§ 67-429B 
and -429C falls outside the scope of the gambling excluded from the constitutional prohibition in 
Article III, Section 20 does not mean, contrary to Knox's assertions, that tribal video game 
machines are unlawful under IGRA. The Secretary has specifically approved inclusion of that 
gaming in the three northern Idaho tribes' compacts. Even were the requested declaratory relief 
to issue, those compacts would remain valid-as would the SBT's right to offer the purported 
"slot machine" gaming at the Casino through the most-favored-nations provision of its compact. 
Knox's position thus is compromised fatally by the need to allege facts establishing a "substantial 
likelihood" not only that the SBT would cease "slot machine" gaming but also that the northern 
Idaho tribes would as well, since the former has the compacted right to operate tribal video game 
machines to the extent the latter can. In light of this legal environment, the present situation does 
not fall within the first National Wrestling exception for controversies "where a party has 
standing to challenge government action that permits or authorizes third-party conduct that 
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would otherwise be illegal in the absence of the Government's action." The Secretarily-approved 
compacts, not Idaho law, "authorizes" the gaming, and nothing in the declaratory judgment 
sought by Knox would undo that authorization and the attendant legality of the machine gaming 
activity insofar as it comports with§ 67-429B. 
b. This controversy also does not fall into the second National Wrestling category 
because even if §§ 67-429B and -429C are deemed to be "a substantial contributing factor in 
bringing about a specific harm," its "undoing of the governmental action will not undo the harm, 
because the new status quo is held in place by other forces." Various legal and policy-related 
considerations compel conclusion that neither the State Officials nor the federal government can 
or will take action to terminate the operation of tribal video gaming machines should the 
requested declaratory relief be entered. 
Only one method existed to raise the purported illegality of including tribal video gaming 
machines as a permissible form of gaming in the class III compacts. Idaho had the opportunity 
to contest the Secretary's 2003 approval of the northern Idaho tribes' amendments on the basis of 
the inconsistency between Article III, Section 20 and the type of gaming permitted under § 67-
42~B but did not do so. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8)(B)(i) (Secretary may disapprove compact if 
it violates "any provision of this Act").6 The six-year limitation period in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(1) 
has since expired. E.g., Macklin v. United States, 300 F.3d 814, 821-22 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(summarizing federal circuit law concerning applicability of§ 2401(1) to APA-based suits). The 
6 Because the Ninth Circuit relied on the most-favored-nation provision of the SBT compact for its holding, no 
Secretarially-approved amendment of the SBT compact was necessary. Tribal video gaming machines instead 
became authorized pursuant to the existing SBT compact provision upon her approval of the northern Idaho tribes' 
compact amendments. See Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 465 F.3d at 1102. 
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State Officials, even were they so disposed, thus would be foreclosed from pursuing judicial or 
other relief-such as a federal court suit under 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii)7 or invocation of 
the relevant compacts' dispute resolution process-predicated on the claim that the operation of 
tribal video gaming machines somehow violates IGRA because, as a matter of federal law, it 
does not. 
Further complicating the legal landscape is an arguable federal circuit dispute over the 
scope of the term "such gaming" in 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(l)(B).8 The Second Circuit has 
construed this provision as requiring the scope of "such gaming"-at least for purposes of 
triggering the duty to negotiate- to be determined with reference to a State's overall "public 
policy" toward the types of gambling activity consigned to class by IGRA. Mashantucket 
Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024, 1030 (2d Cir. 1990) ("The compact process is ... to 
be invoked unless ... it is determined that the state, 'as a matter of criminal law and public 
policy, prohibit[ s] [ class III] gaming activity.' ... Absent such a conflict, the interests of the tribe 
and state are to be reconciled through the negotiation of a compact, and, if negotiations fail to 
achieve a compact and it is determined that the state did not negotiate in good faith, through the 
litigation and mediation process prescribed by section 2710(d)(7)(A) and (B)"); see also Lac du 
Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 770 F. Supp. 480, 486 (W.D. 
Wis. 1991) ("the initial question in determining whether Wisconsin 'permits' the gaming 
activities at issue is not whether the state has given express approval to the playing of a particular 
7 Section 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) creates federal court jurisdiction over causes of action by a State or tribe to enjoin 
class Ill gaming "conducted in violation of any Tribal-State compact ... that is in effect." 
8 Section 27IO(d)(l)(B) provides in full that "Class Ill gaming activities shall be lawful on Indian lands only if such 
activities are ... located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity." 
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game, but whether Wisconsin's public policy toward class III gaming is prohibitory or 
regulatory"), appeal dismissed, 957 F.2d 515 (7th Cir. 1992). The Eighth and Ninth Circuits, 
however, have held that "such gaming" refors to specific types of gambling activity. Cheyenne 
River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d 272, 279 (8th Cir. 1993) ("[t]he 'such gaming' 
language ... does not require the state to negotiate with respect to forms of gaming it does not 
presently permit"); Rumsey Indian Rancheria v. Wilson, 41 F.3d 421, 427 (9th Cir. 1994), 
amended, 64 F.3d 1250 (9th Cir. 1994) and 99 F.3d 321 (9th Cir. 1996) (IGRA requires States 
"only [to] allow Indian tribes to operate games that others can operate"); id., 64 F.3d at 1253 
(Canby, J., dissenting from denial of reh'g en bane) (Mashantucket "arriv[ed] at a conclusion 
precisely opposite to that of [panel opinion in] Rumsey"); see also In re Indian Gaming Related 
Cases, 331 F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 2003) (summarizing the dispute between California and 
various tribes that resulted in the Rumsey litigation, and discussing circuit differences over the 
construction of "such gaming"). 
These interpretative disputes over the term "such gaming" mean, contrary to Knox's 
categorical assertion that the requested declaratory judgment would render any future litigation 
over the lawfulness of tribal video gaming machines "a foregone conclusion" (Appellant's Br. 
19), that plausible arguments exist for the proposition that IGRA permits "such gaming" by 
virtue of, as the SBT asserts in the compact, "the range and scope of gaming activities [under 
Idaho law], with [its] emphasis on a multi-faceted state-sponsored entity." R. 079 § 3.q. Under 
that position, any actual or alleged inconsistency between Article III, Section 20 and§§ 67-429B 
and -429C would be immaterial in the face of Congress' broad power under the Indian 
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Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art. III, § 8, cl. 3. See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 47, 62 (IGRA 
enacted pursuant to Indian Commerce Clause authority, and "[i]f anything, the Indian Commerce 
Clause accomplishes a greater transfer of power from the States to the Federal Government than 
does the Interstate Commerce Clause"). Although the State disagreed with the SBT's "such 
gaming" construction when the compact was executed in 2000 (R. 079 § 3.o), the subsequent 
passage of the Tribal Gaming Initiative established a positive statutory enactment whose federal 
law validity plainly was then, and remains, subject to good-faith dispute.9 
Aside from the absence of any plausible avenue for challenging the Secretary's approval 
and the substantive controversy over the term "such gaming" are significant public policy 
interests that must play an integral role in any determination to pursue removal of "slot 
machines" from the Casino. Elimination of tribal video gaming machines-a lawful activity in 
Idaho since the January 2003 Secretarial approvals-will have a profoundly disruptive effect on 
the settled economic expectations of, and planning by, a substantial group of private and 
9 Knox refers to the July 2001 certificate of review for the Tribal Gaming Initiative prepared by the Attorney 
General's Office pursuant to Idaho Code§ 34-1809 as an "Attorney General's opinion" and argues that "the State ... 
rejected [it] and certified the enactment of Proposition One into law." Appellant's Br. 10. That characterization of 
the review is inaccurate. Subsection (l)(a) of§ 34-1809 provides that the purpose of the review is to analyze "the 
proposal for matters of substantive import and [to] recommend to the petitioner such revision or alteration of the 
measure as may be deemed necessary and appropriate[,]" and subsection (l)(b) deems the recommendations to be 
"advisory only" and leaves to the petitioner the decision to "accept or reject them in whole or in part." Attorney 
General opinions are issued only to certain Idaho officials or governmental entities in accordance with Idaho Code § 
67-1401(6). The certificate's analysis, moreover, did not "agree[]" that the proposed initiative "likely" would be 
unconstitutional if adopted (Appellant's Br. 14); it stated that "the argument that such a gaming statute or initiative is 
permissible cannot be premised upon an assumption that such gaming is permitted by the Idaho Constitution" but, 
rather, must be based upon [certain] legal asswnptions"-two of which were "[f]ederal law is not offended by a 
State statute authorizing forms of gaming on Indian reservations that would not be allowed elsewhere in the State" 
and "[t]he legislature, or the people through the initiative, may allow an activity on Indian reservations that would be 
contrary to the Idaho Constitution if allowed elsewhere in the State." Appellant's Br., Appx. at 5. Although the 
Attorney General further stated that his Office was "not aware of any court decision that answer all of these 
questions" (id at 6), the "such g·amihgu controversy turns on accepting or rejecting comparable 11 lega:I assumptions." 
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governmental actors. The State Officials would necessarily be required to weigh that impact 
against less extreme alternatives for addressing Knox's purported injury-in-fact, including simply 
banning her from the Casino. 
It is precisely these types of considerations that have led the United States Supreme Court 
to reject, on prudential grounds, efforts to have the federal judiciary control prosecutorial or 
other statutory enforcement discretion. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) ("an 
agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a 
decision generally committed to an agency's absolute discretion"); see also Sierra Club v. 
Whitman, 268 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2001) (declining to review agency decision not to take 
enforcement action under the Clean Water Act because, inter alia, "[t]o leave enforcement 
decisions to the discretion of the Administrator is not to relieve the [Environmental Protection 
Agency] of its mission to achieve compliance with the Act; it simply means that the EPA must 
decide, within the limits set by Congress, the most effective way to accomplish the objectives of 
the Act as a whole"); Clementson v. Brock, 806 F.2d 1402, 1404 (9th Cir. 1986) ("[a]s a general 
rule, when an agency determines not to start enforcement proceedings, there is a presumption 
against judicial review of the decision"). It is also why the US Ecology court stressed that courts 
are "loath to find standing when redress depends largely on policy decisions yet to be made by 
government officials." 
Equally unavailing, finally, is Knox's half-hearted suggestion that "the federal authorities 
responsible for prosecuting illegal gaming would do so" if the requested declaratory relief were 
awarded. To accept her proposition means to deem likely that the United States would challenge 
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the validity of all four Secretarially-approved compacts. Knox does not identify the statutory 
authorization that the federal government would invoke to mount such a litigation scenario, and 
none appears available. IGRA's civil jurisdiction provision-25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)-
provides no such remedy, while its addition to Title 18, United States Code, excludes from the 
. term "gambling" any "class III gaming conducted under a Tribal-State compact approved by the 
Secretary of the Interior under section 11 ( d)(8) of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act that is in 
effect." 18 U.S.C. § 1166(c)(2). No plausible basis exists in the amended complaint, even if 
augmented by Knox's brief, for the proposition that the United States can, or if capable as a legal 
matter would, undertake the myriad actions necessary to terminate operation of tribal video 
gaming machines at the Casino. 
4. Knox relies primarily on American Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 146 F. Supp. 
2d 1012 (D. Ariz. 2001), vacated, 305 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2002), and Artichoke Joe's v. Norton, 
216 F. Supp. 2d 1084 (E.D. Cal. 2002), ajfd, 353 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2003), for her claim that the 
requested declaratory judgment would be adequate for redressability purposes. Neither decision 
supports her contention. Indeed, the very reasons why they are inapposite reflect why the 
amended complaint should be dismissed. 
The amended complaint in American Greyhound sought, in relevant part, to require the 
Arizona governor "to send notice of non-renewal, defusing the automatic renewal clause" in the 
compacts that would be renewed, absent the notice, in 2003. 146 F. Supp. 2d at 103 7. The 
plaintiffs accordingly disclaimed any intent "to disturb the existing compacts"-instead only 
"express[ing] alarm at the prospect of renewal of the existing compacts or execution of new 
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compacts." Id. at 1028. The state defendants predicated their redressability challenge on the 
contention that, were the requested relief entered, the tribes simply would continue uncompacted 
gaming. Id. at 103 7. The district court addressed the redressability issue separately as to the 
three claims for relief, but its reasoning as to the first captured the essence of its holding: "[l]t is 
likely that if the court held that the Governor lacks authority [ under state law] to offer slot 
machine, keno and blackjack· gaming in the new compacts, she would not conclude new 
compacts on such terms[,]" and "[b ]esides, the Plaintiffs want the court to enjoin the Governor 
from entering the compacts, a remedy that would further decrease the likelihood that the 
Governor would proceed." Id. at 1038. 
Here, in contrast, not only would the relief sought in the amended complaint leave the 
validity of the existing SBT compact unaffected, but the compact itself also contains no 
expiration date. It instead "remain[s] in effect until renegotiated or replaced"-neither of which 
alternatives can occur without the SBT's consent. R. 103 § 24.c. The Idaho governor, unlike the 
Arizona governor in American Greyhound, possesses no unilateral ability not to renew. Also 
crystal clear is that no reasonable expectation exists that the SBT would agree to cease operation 
of tribal video gaming machines at the Casino because of the requested declaratory relief, given 
its position as articulated in the compact's Recitals (R. 079 § 3.q), see supra at 9, and the fact that 
it has a judicially-confirmed right to continue such operation under the most-favored-nations 
provision as long as the northern Idaho tribes do so. Nothing in Knox's brief, much less the 
amended complaint, attempts to show the contrary. There is no likelihood that the requested 
declaratory relief would result in the removal of tribal video game machines from the Casino. 
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The Ninth Circuit, moreover, vacated the American Greyhound district court decision on 
grounds that revealed the double-edged quality of the lower court's reasoning that gives rise to 
Knox's dilemma: 
The compacts provide for automatic renewal if neither party gives the requisite 
notice of termination. This provision is an integral part of the existing compacts, and 
was part of the bargain that the tribes entered with the State. Prior to this litigation, the 
tribes enjoyed compacts that would endure indefinitely so long as the Governor was 
willing. Although the Governor had indicated a desire to negotiate modified compacts 
to take effect when the original ten-year compact terms expired, it is by no means 
probable that the Governor, if unable to negotiate different agreements, would have 
elected to terminate the present ones and shut down virtually the entire Indian gaming 
industry in Arizona. Yet the district court's injunction requires her to do just that. ... 
Before this litigation, the tribes had a right to renewal if a Governor was willing to leave 
the compacts in effect; after the litigation, termination was the only option .... The 
interests of the tribes in their compacts are impaired and, not being parties, the tribes 
cannot defend those interests. 
305 F.3d at 1023. The simple fact that the district court's injunction compelled the governor to 
take an action to exercise a contractual option to terminate the compacts sufficed to implicate the 
absent tribes' interests under those agreements-a determination that laid the predicate for the 
amended complaint's dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19. Instantly, to the extent Knox argues 
that the requested declaratory judgment obligate the governor, by virtue of his oath of office 
(Appellant's Br. 23-24), to request renegotiation of the SBT compact to eliminate tribal video 
gaming machines when he otherwise would not, she encounters Scylla in the form ofl.R.C.P. 19; 
to the extent, as discussed above, the State Officials have no ability to compel through judicial 
mechanisms removal of those machines and even she does not suggest the likelihood of the SBT 
doing so voluntarily, Knox confronts Charybdis in the form of redressability. Either route is 
lethal. 
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Artichoke Joe's, unlike American Greyhound which was a suit against only state officials 
initiated in state court and removed to federal court (146 F. Supp. 2d at 1025-26), involved an 
action commenced in the latter against federal and state officials, including the Secretary (216 F . 
. Supp. 2d at 1097·98). The claim against the federal defendants challenged under the APA the 
Secretary's approval of compacts with California: tribes, which allegedly violated federal law 
including IGRA, while the claims against the state officials alleged violations of state law related 
to the compacts. Id. at 1098-99; see also id. at 1112-14, 1116-18 (rejecting federal defendants' 
motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds claim under 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(l)). The Artichoke 
Joe's plaintiffs thus pursued the course which was not, but should have been, followed here: 
They invoked the APA judicial review provisions to challenge the Secretary's compact-approval 
determinations under 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8)(A). The presence of the APA claim directed to the 
validity of the Secretarial approvals made entirely tenable the plaintiffs' contention that federal 
law enforcement officials would invoke 18 U.S.C. § 1166 should tribes with invalidated 
compacts nonetheless continue to engage in class III gaming. 216 F. Supp. 2d at 1109. The 
lengthy quotation in Knox's brief merely makes that point in response to the state defendants' 
redressability argument as to one claim. Appellant's Br. 21-22. As discussed above, the 
declaratory relief requested here will not invalidate the SBT's or the northern Idaho tribes' 
compacts. Artichoke Joe's principal relevance lies in underscoring the need to have challenged 
the Secretary's approval of those compacts. 10 
10 The two other decisions relied upon by Knox-Los Angeles County Bar Association v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 
1992), and Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452 (2002)--add nothing to her position concerning to the likelihood of a 
declaratory judgment being given effect by third parties. Appellant's Br. 24-26. In Los Angeles County, the claim 
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II. RELIEF REDRESSING PLAINTIFFS' . ALLEGED INJURY CANNOT BE 
ENTERED IN THE ABSENCE OF THE GAMING TRIBES' JOINDER AS 
DEFENDANTS, AND THEIR JOINDER IS PRECLUDED BY TRIBAL 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
The District Court relied largely on Knox's representations in concluding that the gaming 
tribes were not required to be joined under I.R.C.P. 19. E.g., R. 196 ("Plaintiffs ... do not seek 
to enjoin the use of tribal video gaming machines by any or all of the Indian tribes in the state"). 
H.er strategy recalibration on appeal vitiates the fundamental premise for the lower court's Rule 
19 disposition since, as now articulated by Knox, a necessary consequence of the declaratory 
relief will be imposition of a duty on the State Officials, and even the federal government, to 
seek elimination of unlawful class III gaming activity. See R. 199-200 ( deeming Knox's claim 
that the requested relief would redress her injury-in-fact foreclosed "[f]or the same reasons" that 
foreclose the State Officials' Rule 19 defense). While the abuse-of-discretion standard applies in 
assessing the Rule 19 determination below, it therefore cannot be assumed that the District Court 
would have reached the same conclusion had Knox presented her arguments then as she 
presently does. The indispensable party issue need be addressed only if this Court finds the 
requested declaratory relief to possess the requisite "substantial likelihood" of redressing her 
alleged injury-in-fact. 
was a garden-variety challenge to a state statute whose invalidation logically would lead to replacement by a 
provision compliant with the federal court judgment and appropriate executive branch implementation that, together, 
would redress the plaintiffs' injury-in-fact. 979 F.2d at 701. The redressability holding in Utah is comparable. 
There, the Supreme Court's rejection of North Carolina's jurisdictional challenge turned on the facts that (1) the 
relevant statutes, 2 U.S.C. § 2a(a) and (b) and Pub. L. No. 105-119, Title II, § 209(b), 111 Stat. 2481 (1997), could 
not be read "so absolutely" as to "bar[] a certificate's revision in all cases no matter what" or post-certification 
lawsuits (536 U.S. at 462) and (2) "the relevant calculations and consequent apportionment-related steps would be 
purely mechanical[] and several months would remain prior to the first post-2000 census congressional election" (id. 
at 463). Nothing suggests, in contrast, that the requested declaratory judgment will eliminate "slot machines" at the 
Casino for those reasons discussed above. 
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A. Federally-acknowledged Indian tribes are immune from suit by Idaho or its 
citizens in any court absent their consent or congressional abrogation of that immunity. E.g., 
Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techns., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen 
Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 510 (1991). The amended complaint does not 
name the SBT or the three northern Idaho gaming tribes as defendants and, in light of tribal 
sovereign immunity, could not do so even if Knox so desired. It nonetheless seeks relief that, to 
be effective, must adjudicate the SBT's right to operate tribal video gaming machines under its 
compact. The issue accordingly becomes whether such relief may be entered consistently with 
I.R.C.P. l 9's requirements as to joinder of necessary parties. 11 
Rule 19(a) is derived from Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a). Federal courts, whose decisions are 
given substantial weight in detennining the Idaho rule's proper application, 12 apply a three-step 
test under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, both currently and as configured when this Court modified the 
Idaho rules in 1975, to determine whether an absent party should be joined and, if so, whether 
11 Knox argued below that the Declaratory Judgment Act's joinder provision-Idaho Code § I 0-1211-governs the 
indispensable party issue. R. 130-131. Her argument failed to take account of this Court's subsequent promulgation 
ofl.R.C.P. 57, which is directed specifically to declaratory judgments and whose opening sentence states that "[t]he 
procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment pursuant to the statutes of this state[] shall be in accordance with 
these rules." The comparably worded Fed. R. Civ. P. 57 has been so construed. See generally 10B Charles Alan 
Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2768, at 664-65 (3d ed. l 998) ("the requirements of compulsory 
joinder of those needed for a just adjudication set out in Rule 19 are fully applicable" to actions seeking declaratory 
relief). 
12 As this Court explained in Chacon v. Sperry Corp., 11 l Idaho 270, 723 P.2d 814 (1986): 
Part of the reason for adopting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Idaho, and interpreting our own 
rules adopted from the federal courts as uniformly as possible with the federal cases, was to establish a 
uniform practice and procedure in both the federal and state courts in the State of Idaho. We recently 
adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence as the rules of evidence in Idaho in order to obtain uniformity in 
the trial practice in both the state and federal courts. Lack of uniformity in the rules of procedure, as well 
as rules of evidence, creates problems for both the comts and the practitioners. These problems can be 
avoided by interpreting our rules of civil procedure in conformance with the interpretation placed upon 
the same rules by the federal courts. 
Ill Idaho at 275, 723P.2dat819. 
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the action should be permitted to continue whenjoinder is not feasible: 
Application of Rule 19 involves "three successive inquiries." [,0 First, the court 
must determine whether a nonparty should be joined under Rule 19(a). We and other 
courts use the term "necessary" to describe those "[p Jersons to [b ]e Li]oined if 
[f]easible." ... [,I] Ifan absentee is a necessary party under Rule 19(a), the second stage 
is for the court to determine whether it is feasible to order that the absentee be 
joined .... [,I] Finally, if joinder is not feasible, the court must determine at the third 
stage whether the case can proceed without the absentee, or whether the absentee is an 
"indispensable party" such that the action must be dismissed. . . . Rule 19 uses "the 
word 'indispensable' only in a conclusory sense, that is, a person is 'regarded as 
indispensable' when he cannot be made a party and, upon consideration of the factors 
[in Rule l 9(b)], it is determined that in his absence it would be preferable to dismiss the 
action, rather than to retain it." 
Wilbur v. Locke, 423 F.3d 1101, 1111-12 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). 13 Rule 19 issues 
frequently arise in connection with Indian tribes. E.g., Yashenko v. Harrah's NC Casino Co., 
446 F.3d 541, 551-53 (4th Cir. 2006) (tribe was indispensable party in terminated employee's 
suit against casino management company); American Greyhound, 305 F.3d at 1023-24 (tribes 
were necessary parties incapable of joinder in suit challenging governor's authority to renew 
compacts); see generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Comparative Rights of Indispensable 
Sovereigns, 40 Gonz. L. Rev. I (2004-2005) ( discussing application of Rule 19-related joinder 
where rights ofindian tribes may be affected). 
B. Wilbur and American Greyhound are particularly instructive concemmg the 
proper application of I.R.C.P. 19 under the circumstances here. The Wilbur plaintiffs sought to 
" Several amendments to the federal rule took effect in 2007. The Supreme Court summarized them in Republic of 
Philippines v. Pimentel, 128 S. Ct. 2180 (2008), and characterized the modifications as "stylistic only" and as 
leaving "unchanged" both "the substance and operation of the Rule both pre- and post-2007." Id at 2184; see also 
Cachil Dehe Band of Wintun Indians v. California, 547 F.3d 962, 969 n.6 (9th Cir. 2008). The present formulation 
ofl.R.C.P. 19(a) includes as separate sul>paragraphs what was set out in the pre-2007 Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 (a) through 
(d). Rule 19(a)(l), Fed. R. Civ. P., in its pre-2007 form was identical to l.R.C.P. 19(a)(l), !>tit the references in 
Wilbur to Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b) fmd their corollary in I.R.C.P. 19(a)(2). 
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enjoin the Washington governor and vanous state revenue department officials from 
implementing a cigarette tax compact with a tribe on the ground that arrangement would violate 
the Indian Commerce Clause and various federal statutes. 423 F.3d at 1104-05. The Ninth 
Circuit had no difficulty concluding that the absent tribe was a necessary party, since it had a 
legally protected interest in the involved compact's benefits and since the plaintiffs were required 
to show "the illegality of the Compact in order to succeed on the merits of any of their claims." 
Id. at 11 I 2. Recognizing that the compact was contractual in nature, the court pointed to various 
decisions standing for the '"fundamental principle' that 'a party to a contract is necessary, and if 
not susceptible to joinder, indispensable to litigation seeking to decimate that contract."' 
Id. at 1113. The Ninth Circuit rejected the contention that state officials could represent the 
tribe's interests adequately, noting that "the Tribe and the state have beeh adversaries in disputes 
over the subject of the [compact] in the past (indeed, resolution of a 'long-standing disagreement' 
regarding cigarette taxation was one of the purposes recited in the Compact's preamble)" and that 
"the state owes the Tribe no trust duty that might ensure vindication of the Tribe's interest." Id. 
To accept the plaintiffs' adequate-representation argument, the court added, would negate the 
"general rule" that all parties to a contract-there the tribal-state compacts-are necessary parties 
to an action whose aim is to compromise a contract in some material respect. Id. at 1114. 
The Wilbur court turned then to the Rule l 9(b) considerations and held the tribe 
indispensable. 14 It noted the obvious impairment of the tribe's interest if the compact were 
14 The 2007 amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b), deleted the term "indispensable." Rule 19(b) currently reads: 
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determined to be unlawful and the impossibility of shaping protective provisions in a judgment 
given the fact that plaintiffs "want nothing less than nullification of the Compact." 423 F.3d 
at 1114. The lack of any available shaping relief also carried with it the conclusion that an 
adequate judgment could not be entered because any decree would prejudice the tribe's interest in 
the compact's integrity. Only the fourth consideration-"whether [the plaintiffs] will have an 
adequate remedy if the action is dismissed"-weighed against an indispensability finding, but the 
court observed that "we have 'regularly held that the tribal interest in immunity overcomes the 
lack of an alternative remedy or forum for the plaintiffs.'" Id. at 1115. Finally, it rejected the 
_plaintiffs' reliance on the "public rights exception," reasoning that the doctrine does-not apply 
where the litigation could "destroy the legal entitlements of the absent parties." Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The plaintiffs' claim sought precisely that result, since "[t]he Tribe 
would lose valuable contractual benefits if the Compact was held invalid." 
While Wilbur involved a tax agreement, American Greyhound arose, again, from a suit 
filed by racetrack operators challenging a statute that empowered the Arizona governor to 
negotiate new, or to extend existing, class III gaming compacts with various tribes 
"[n]otwithstanding any other law." The district court, whose standing analysis is discussed in 
When Joinder Is Not Feasible. If a person who is required to be joined if feasible cannot be joined, the 
court must determine whether, in equity and good conscience, the action should proceed among the 
existing parties or should be dismissed. The factors for the court to consider include: 
(I) the extent to which a judgment rendered in the person's absence might prejudice that person or the 
existing parties; 
(2) the extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or avoided by: (A) protective provisions in the 
judgment; (B) shaping the relief; or (C) other measures; 
(3) whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence would be adequate; and 
(4) whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if the action were dismissed for nonjoinder. 
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Argument Part I.B.4, enjoined the governor from engaging in either action because, in its view, 
the state statute which authorized her to negotiate the compacts embodied an unlawful delegation 
of legislative power insofar as it exempted such compacts from compliance with other state 
statutory constraints on gambling. American Greyhound, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 1066-67, 1069-72. 
The district court further held that various types of "casino" gan1ing were unlawful under 
Arizona Jaw. Id at 1063-66. 
In reversing, the Ninth Circuit did not reach the substantive issues because it concluded 
that the absent tribes were necessary and indispensable parties under Rule 19. The court of 
appeals found that the tribes were necessary parties under Rule 19(a)(2)(i) because, as a practical 
matter, the relief entered by the lower court impeded the tribes' ability to protect their contracted-
for compact interests. 305 F.3d at 1023. It reasoned in part: 
The district court's ruling that state law prohibits casino-type gaming, and its 
consequent ruling that such gaming by Indian tribes violates IGRA, present another 
problem. Although the district court enjoined only the execution of future compacts or 
the extension of existing ones, its order amounts to a declaratory judgment that the 
present gaming conducted by the tribes is unlawful. It is true that the tribes are not 
bound by this ruling under principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel because they 
are not parties, but their interests mi'ly well be affected as a practical matter by the 
judgment that its operations are· illegal. . .. The sovereign power of the tribes to 
negotiate compacts is impaired by the ruling .... Moreover, enforcement authorities 
may consider themselves compelled to act against the tribes. 
Id at 1024 ( citations omitted). The court of appeals next addressed the Rule l 9(b) factors and 
held that (1} the tribes would suffer "enormous" prejudice from the required compact 
terminations; (2) the prejudice could not be ameliorated through remedial shaping; (3) any 
judgment in the tribes' absence would not be adequate from the plaintiffs' perspective unless it 
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compromised tribal interests; .and ( 4) the tribes' immunity from suit took precedence over the 
unavailability of any other forum for the plaintiffs' grievance in the event of dismissal. 
Id. at 1025. It also found the plaintiffs' invocation of the public rights exception unavailing. 
Although recognizing that "[t]he general subject of gaming may be of great public interest," the 
court deemed dispositive the fact that "[t]he plaintiffs sought th[e] injunction to avoid 
competitive harm to their own operations." Id. at 1026. "[T]he rights in issue between the 
plaintiffs in this case, the tribes and the state," in short, "are more private than public." Id. 
C. Wilbur and American Greyhound leave no doubt about the necessary and 
indispensable party status of not only the SBT but also the northern Idaho tribes whose compacts 
permit tribal video gaming machines. 15 First, no legitimate question exists that Knox intends the 
declaratory relief sought-that the tribal video gaming machines operated by the SBT and the 
other tribes violate Idaho law-has "as a practical matter" eliminating a compact-based right 
presently enjoyed by the tribes. I.R.C.P. 19(a)(l). She denied any such intent before the District 
Court both through the amendments to paragraph 8.g of the original complaint and limiting relief 
15 Knox relied below primarily upon two state court decisions-Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. 
Pataki, 798 N.E.2d 1043 (N.Y. 2003), and Panzer v. Dalton, 680 N.W.2d 666 (Wis. 2004)--for the proposition that 
joinder of the SBT and the northern Idaho gaming tribes was unnecessary. R. 172-176. Saratoga grounded its 
conclusion on the concern that finding indispensability would mean "[t]he Executive's actions would be insulated 
from review, a prospect antithetical to our system of checks and balances." 798 N.W.2d at 1058. While 
acknowledging that various federal circuit court decisions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, including the Ninth Circuit's 
decision in American Greyhound, had reached a contrary result, the court also observed that "[o]ur review of the 
CPLR 1001 factors, informed by New York's policy disfavoring dismissal, convinces us that we should not follow 
those cases." Id at 1059 n.9. Panzer followed the substantially same analytical C<mrse-"[w]e will not venture the 
delicate balance of shared power among our three branches of government on the chosen absence of a potential 
party"-and cited Saratoga favorably. 680 N.W.2d at 683 & n.20. Neither case considered the feasibility of an 
APA-based suit against the Secretary with regard to compact approvals under IGRA, and both courts either 
explicitly or implicitly declined to follow the contrary application given under comparable circumstances to Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 19 in, inter a/ia, American Greyhound. This Court, as stated in Chacon, views federal precedent otherwise. 
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sought to the declaratory judgment and through her briefing but, before this Court, makes it 
perfectly clear so as to advance her redressability position. Compare, e.g., R. 128, 132, 134 with 
Appellant's Br. 19, 23. 
The Ninth Circuit in American Greyhound spoke directly to the "practical" prejudice 
attendant to Knox's current position when it observed that "[a]lthough the district court enjoined 
only the execution of future compacts or the extension of existing ones, its order amounts to a 
declaratory judgment that the present gaming conducted by the tribes is unlawful" and that "[i]t 
is true that the tribes are not bound by this ruling under principles of res judicata or collateral 
estoppel because they are not parties, but their interests may well be affected as a practical 
matter by the judgment that its operations are illegal." 305 F.3d at 1024 (first emphasis added); 
Cachil Dehe Band, 54 7 F .3d at 972 ( distinguishing American Greyhound because the lawsuit did 
"not seek to invalidate compacts to which [the plaintiff tribe] is not a party; this litigation is not 
'aimed' at the other tribes and their gaming"). The tribes have an unquestionable interest for Rule 
19 purposes in any judicial proceeding that has as its goal declaring unconstitutional a voter 
initiative that not only sanctioned a form of gaming for their specific use and benefit but also has 
been serving that objective for years. See id at 971 (absent tribes' "[i]nterest could be protected 
[for required-party status] if it actually 'arises from terms in bargained contracts'"); Mudarri v. 
State, 196 P.3d 153, 162 (Wash. App. Ct. 2008) ("[t]he Tribe and the State both entered into the 
State-Tribe Compact; both are necessary parties" under state procedural rule identical to pre-
2007 Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 where plaintiff sought to have compact provision declared unlawful); 
Srader v. Verant, 964 P.2d 82, 90 (N.M. 1998) (tribes were indispensable parties under state 
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procedural rule identical to then-existing Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 in action seeking to compel 
enforcement of state gambling prohibitions with respect to pre-compact tribal gaming; ''[t]his 
requested relief would halt the exchange of money upon which the tribes rely for business at 
their casinos"). 16 
The State, moreover, would be exposed to a "substantial risk of incurring ... inconsistent 
obligations" within the reach of I.R.C.P. 19(a)(l). Knox seeks relief whose objective is to 
impose obligations on the State Officials which conflict with the Ninth Circuit's judgment 
authorizing the SBT to add tribal video gaming machines to its IGRA-sanctioned class III 
gaming compact. That judgment is binding on Idaho through claim-preclusion principles 
because the potential illegality of tribal gaming video machines was not, but could have been, 
raised in the earlier litigation. E.g., Sidney v. Zah, 718 F.2d 1453, 1458 (9th Cir. 1983). The 
same risk of inconsistency exists as to the other tribes' gaming compacts, which are valid under 
IGRA now and impose obligations on Idaho directly inconsistent with those Knox seeks through 
the requested declaratory relief. 
Second, any reasonable assessment of the I.R.C.P. 19(a)(2) factors requires the 
16 The potential prejudice to the absent tribes distinguishes this matter from two Tenth Circuit decisions relied upon 
by Knox below: Sac and Fox Nation v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1250 (10th Cir. 2001), and Kansas v. United States, 249 
F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2001). R. 176. · The Sac and Fox court held that a tribe was neither a necessary nor 
indispensable party in an APA-based challenge to a Secretarial decision to take land into trust for gaming purposes, 
observing in part that "the potential of prejudice to that interest is offset in large part by the fact that the Secretary's 
interests in defending his decisions are substantially similar, if not virtually identical, to those of the Wyandotte 
Tribe." 240 F.3d at 1260. The Kansas panel deemed Sac and Fox to "control[] our resolution of the [absent tribe's] 
Rule 19 argument(,]" since "Kansas' claims in this case focus on the propriety of an agency decision that the tract 
qualities for Jndian gaming under IGRA" and "the potential for prejudice to the Miami Tribe is largely nonexistent 
due to the presence in this suit of not only the NIGC and other Federal Defendants, but also [various nonfederal 
defendants]." 249 F.3d at 1226-27. Knox has never suggested that the State Officials have "virtually identical" 
interests to the absent tribes-a notion rejected in Wilbur. 423 F.3d at 1113. 
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conclusion that the tribes are indispensable. The threshold consideration-the possibility of 
prejudice to the absent party-has been discussed and strongly counsels indispensability. There 
additionally appear no "protective measures" that could mitigate this prejudice. Any meaningful 
judgment rendered in Knox's favor to address her gambling addiction would require the SBT to 
cease operating tribal video gaming machines; something less leaves her in precisely the same 
practical position as she is now, i.e., living in proximity to allegedly available "slot machine" 
gaming. Here, absent the SBT's joinder, Knox simply cannot secure a judgment that redresses 
her asserted injury-in-fact. See Yashenko, 446 F.3d at 553 ("any judgment entered without 
joining the Tribe would be inadequate because it would bind only Yashenko and Harrah's; the 
Tribe would remain free to enforce the tribal preference policy on its reservation and through its 
contractual relations"). As is often the result where tribal immunity from suit is the basis for the 
infeasibility of joinder, Knox may have no alternative forum at this time. Cf Pimentel, 128 S. 
Ct. at 2194 ("Dismissal under Rule 19(b) will mean, in some instances, that plaintiffs will be left 
without a forum for definitive resolution of their claims. But that result is contemplated under 
the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity). The lack of one, however, simply would mean that 
she must employ non-judicial means to address her gambling compulsion. She is situated no 
differently in this respect than the complainants in Wilbur and American Greyhound. 
Last, the public rights exception has no play here. Knox advances a sui generis theory of 
injury for the precise purpose of avoiding the "generalized grievance" characterization. But for 
her alleged and quite individualized addiction to "slot machine" gambling, she would not be 
before this Court. The complaint, therefore, should be dismissed under I.R.C.P. l 2(b )(7). 
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CONCLUSION 
The District Court's judgment should be affirmed. 
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ADDENDUM A 
IDAHO CONSTITUTION ARTICLE III, SECTION 20 
AND 
IDAHO CODE§§ 67-429A TO -429C 
IDAHO CONSTITUTION 
Article III,§ 20. Gambling prohibited. 
(l) Gambling is contrary to public policy and is strictly prohibited except for the 
following: 
a. A state lottery which is authorized by the state if conducted in conformity with 
enabling legislation; and 
b. Pari-mutuel betting if conducted in conformity with enabling legislation; and 
c. Bingo and raffle games that are operated by qualified charitable organizations 
in the pursuit of charitable purposes if conducted in conformity with enabling legislation. 
(2) No activities permitted by subsection(!) shall employ any form of casino gambling 
including, but not limited to, blackjack, craps, roulette, poker, bacarrat [baccarat], keno 
and slot machines, or employ any electronic or electromechanical imitation or simulation 
of any form of casino gambling. 
(3) The legislature shall provide by law penalties for violations of this section. 
(4) Notwithstanding the foregoing, the following are not gambling and are not prohibited 
by this section: 
a. Merchant promotional contests and drawings conducted incidentally to bona 
fide nongaming business operations, if prizes are awarded without consideration being 
charged to participants; and 
b. Games that award only additional play. 
IDAHO CODE 
§ 67-429A. State-tribal gaming compacts. 
(I) The governor or his designee may represent the state of Idaho in any gaming 
negotiations the state is requested to participate in pursuant to 25 U.S.C. section 2701 et 
seq. The director of legislative services or his designee may attend all negotiations 
pursuant to this section as an observer and shall brief the membership of the legislative 
council on the status of the negotiations. 
(2) The state may enter into those gaming compacts negotiated with Indian tribes 
pursuant to this section provided: 
(a) The compact only authorizes an Indian tribe to conduct those forms of gaming 
authorized by Idaho law; 
(b) The compact does not obligate the state of Idaho to appropriate state funds; 
and 
(c) The governor serves a copy of the compact on each member of the legislative 
council at least twenty-one (21) calendar days before the compact is signed. 
(3) Any proposed gaming compact not complying with subsection (2) of this section 
shall be null and void unless ratified by both houses of the legislature by adoption of a 
concurrent resolution. 
(4) No power, privilege or other authority shall be exercised under the provisions of this 
section where otherwise prohibited by the constitution or laws of the state of Idaho or the 
United States. 
(5) The provisions of this section shall not be construed as a waiver of any defenses or 
immunities to which the state of Idaho is entitled under either the constitution or the laws 
of the state ofldaho or the United States. 
§ 67-429B. Authorized tribal video gaming machines. 
(!) Indian tribes are authorized to conduct gaming using tribal video gaming machines 
pursuant to state-tribal gaming compacts which specifically permit their use. A tribal 
video gaming machine may be used to conduct gaming only by an Indian tribe, is not 
activated by a handle or lever, does not dispense coins, currency, tokens, or chips, and 
performs only the following functions: 
(a) Accepts currency or other representative of value to qualify a player to 
participate in one or more games; 
(b) Dispenses, at the player's request, a cash out ticket that has printed upon it the 
game identifier and the player's credit balance; 
(c) Shows on a video screen or other electronic display, rather than on a paper 
ticket, the results of each game played; 
(d) Shows on a video screen or other electronic display, in an area separate from 
the game results, the player's credit balance; 
(e) Selects randomly, by computer, numbers or symbols to determine game 
results; and 
(f) Maintains the integrity of the operations of the terminal. 
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(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of Idaho law, a tribal video gaming machine as 
described ·in subsection (!) above is not a slot machine or an electronic or 
electromechanical imitation or simulation of any form of casino gambling. 
67-429C. Amendment of state-tribal gaming compacts. 
(]) Any tribe with an existing state-tribal gaming compact may amend its compact 
through the procedure set forth in subsection (2) below to incorporate all of the following 
terms: 
(a) As clarified by this compact amendment, the tribe is permitted to conduct 
gaming using tribal video gaming machines as described in Section 67-429B, Idaho 
Code. 
(b) In the IO years following incorporation of this term into its compact, the 
number of tribal video gaming machines the tribe may possess is limited to the number of 
tribal video gaming machines possessed by the tribe as of January I, 2002, plus 25% of 
that number; provided, however, that no increase in any single year shall exceed 5% of 
the number possessed as of January I, 2002. Thereafter, the tribe may operate such 
additional· tribal video gaming machines as are agreed to pursuant to good faith 
negotiations between the state and the tribe under a prudent business standard. 
(c) To the extent such contributions are not already required under the tribe's 
existing compact, the tribe agrees to contribute 5% of its annual net gaming income for 
the support of local educational programs and schools on or near the reservation. The 
tribe may elect to contribute additional sums for these or other educational purposes. 
Disbursements of these funds shall be at the sole direction of the tribe. 
(d) The tribe agrees not to conduct gaming outside oflndian lands. 
(2) To amend its compact to incorporate the terms set forth in subsection (]) above, a 
tribe shall deliver to the Secretary of State a tribal resolution signifying the tribe's 
acceptance of the terms. Immediately upon delivery of such tribal resolution to the 
Secretary of State, (a) the tribe's state-tribal gaming compact shall be deemed amended to · 
incorporate the terms; (b) the tribe's compact as so amended shall be deemed approved by 
the state in accordance with Section 67-429A, Idaho Code, without the need for further 
signature or action by the executive or legislative branches of state government, and (c) 
except to the extent federal government approval is required, the newly incorporated 
compact terms shall be deemed effective immediately. 
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed to (a) indicate that any gaming activity 
currently conducted by any tribe is unauthorized or otherwise inappropriate under Idaho 
law or the tribe's existing compact, or (b) prohibit a tribe from negotiating with the state 
for an initial compact or a compact amendment regarding tribal video gaming machines 
or any other matter through a procedure other than the procedure specified in subsection 
(2) above or which contains terms different than those specified in subsection (I) above. 
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ADDENDUMB 
SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE 
INDIAN GAMING REGULATORY ACT 
25 U.S.C. §§ 2703 AND 2710 
18 u.s.c. § 1166 
25 U.S.C. § 2703. Definitions 
For purposes of this chapter--
(1) The term "Attorney General" means the Attorney General of the United 
States. 
(2) The term "Chairman" means the Chairman of the National Indian Gaming 
Commission. 
(3) The term "Commission" means the National Indian Gaming Commission 
established pursuant to section 2704 of this title. 
(4) The term "Indian lands" means--
(A) all lands within the limits of any Indian reservation; and 
(B) any lands title to which is either held in trust by the United States for 
the benefit of any Indian tribe or individual or held by any Indian tribe or 
individual subject to restriction by the United States against alienation and over 
which an Indian tribe exercises governmental power. 
(5) The term "Indian tribe" means any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other 
organized group or community of Indians which--
(A) is recognized as eligible by the Secretary for the special programs and 
services provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as 
Indians, and 
(B) is recognized as possessing powers of self-government. 
(6) The term "class I gaming" means social games solely for prizes of minimal 
value or traditional forms of Indian gaming engaged in by individuals as a part of, or in 
connection with, tribal ceremonies or celebrations. 
(7) (A) The term "class II gaming" means--
(i) the game of chance commonly known as bingo (whether or not 
electronic, computer, or other technologic aids are used in connection 
therewith)--
(!) which is played for prizes, including monetary 
prizes, with cards bearing numbers or other designations, 
(II) in which the holder of the card covers such numbers 
or designations when objects, similarly numbered or designated, 
are drawn or electronically determined, and 
(Ill) in which the game is won by the first person 
covering a previously designated arrangement of numbers or 
designations on such cards, 
including (if played in the same location) pull-tabs, lotto, punch boards, tip 
jars, instant bingo, and other games similar to bingo, and 
(ii) card games that--
(I) are explicitly authorized by the laws of the State, or 
(II) are not explicitly prohibited by the laws of the State 
and are played at any location in the State, 
but only if such card games are played in conformity with those 
laws and regulations (if any) of the State regarding hours or periods of 
operation of such card games or limitations on wagers or pot sizes in such 
card games. 
(B) The term "class II gaming" does not include--
(i) any banking card games, including baccarat, chemin de fer, or 
blackjack (21 ), or 
(ii) electronic or electromechanical facsimiles of any game of 
chance or slot machines of any kind. 
(C) Notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph, the term "class 
II gaming" includes those card games played in the State of Michigan, the State of 
North Dakota, the State of South Dakota, or the State of Washington, that were 
actually operated in such State by an Indian tribe on or before May 1, 1988, but 
only to the extent of the nature and scope of the card games that were actually 
operated by an Indian tribe in such State on or before such date, as determined by 
the Chairman. 
(D) Notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph, the term "class 
II gaming" includes, during the I-year period beginning on October 17, 1988, any 
gaming described in subparagraph (B)(ii) that was legally operated on Indian 
lands on or before May 1, 1988, if the Indian tribe having jurisdiction over the 
lands on which such gaming was operated requests the State, by no later than the 
date that is 30 days after October 17, 1988, to negotiate a Tribal-State compact 
under section 2710( d)(3) of this title. 
(E) Notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph, the term 'class 
II gaming' includes, during the ]-year period beginning on December 17, 1991, 
any gaming described in subparagraph (B)(ii) that was legally operated on Indian 
lands in the State of Wisconsin on or before May l, 1988, if the Indian tribe 
having jurisdiction over the lands on which such gaming was operated requested 
the State, by no later than November 16, 1988, to negotiate a Tribal-State compact 
under section 2710( d)(3) of this title. 
(F) If, during the !-year period described in subparagraph (E), there is a 
final judicial determination that the gaming described in subparagraph (E) is not 
legal as a matter of State law, then such gaming on such Indian land shall cease to 
operate on the date next following the date of such judicial decision. 
(8) The term "class III gaming" means all forms of gaming that are not class I 
gaming or class II gaming. 
(9) The tenn "net revenues" means gross revenues of an Indian gaming activity 
less amounts paid out as, or paid for, prizes and total operating expenses, excluding 
management fees. 
(10) The term "Secretary" means the Secretary of the Interior. 
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25 V.S.C. § 2710. Tribal gaming ordinances 
(a) Jurisdiction over class I and class II gaming activity 
(1) Class I gaming on Indian lands is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Indian tribes and shall not be subject to the provisions of this chapter. 
(2) Any class II gaming on Indian lands shall continue to be within the 
jurisdiction of the Indian tribes, but shall be subject to the provisions of this 
chapter. 
(b) Regulation of class II gaming activity; net revenue allocation; audits; contracts 
(1) An Indian tribe may engage in, or license and regulate, class II gaming on 
Indian lands within such tribe's jurisdiction, if--
(A) such Indian gaming is located within a State that permits such gaming 
for any purpose by any person, organization or entity (and such gaming is not 
otherwise specifically prohibited on Indian lands by Federal law), and 
(B) the governing body of the Indian tribe adopts an ordinance or 
resolution which is approved by the Chairman. 
A separate license issued by the Indian tribe shall be required for each place, 
facility, or location on Indian lands at which class II gaming is conducted. 
(2) The Chairman shall approve any tribal ordinance or resolution concerning the 
conduct, or regulation of class II gaming on the Indian lands within the tribe's 
jurisdiction if such ordinance or resolution provides that--
(A) except as provided in paragraph ( 4 ), the Indian tribe will have the sole 
proprietary interest and responsibility for the conduct of any gaming activity; 
(B) net revenues from any tribal gaming are not to be used for purposes 
other than--
(i) to fund tribal government operations or programs; 
(ii) to provide for the general welfare of the Indian tribe and its 
members; 
(iii) to promote tribal economic development; 
(iv) to donate to charitable organizations; or 
(v) to help fund operations of local government agencies; 
(C) annual outside audits of the gaming, which may be encompassed 
within existing independent tribal audit systems, will be provided by the Indian 
tribe to the Commission; 
(D) all contracts for supplies, services, or concessions for a contract 
amount in excess of$25,000 annually (except contracts for professional legal or 
accounting services) relating to such gaming shall be subject to such independent 
audits; 
(E) the construction and maintenance of the gaming facility, and the 
operation of that gaming is conducted in a maimer which adequately protects the 
environment and the public health and safety; and 
(F) there is an adequate system which--
(i) ensures that background investigations are conducted on the 
primary management officials and key employees of the gaming enterprise 
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and that oversight of such officials and their management is conducted on 
an ongoing basis; and 
(ii) includes--
(!) tribal licenses for primary management officials and key 
employees of the gaming enterprise with prompt notification to the 
Commission of the issuance of such licenses; 
(II) a standard whereby any person whose prior activities, 
criminal record, if any, or reputation, habits and associations pose 
a threat to the public interest or to the effective regulation of 
gaming, or create or enhance the dangers of unsuitable, unfair, or 
illegal practices and methods and activities in the conduct of 
gaming shall not be eligible for employment; and 
(III) notification by the Indian tribe to the Commission of 
the results of such background check before the issuance of any of 
such licenses. 
(3) Net revenues from any class II gaming activities conducted or licensed by any 
Indian tribe may be used to make per capita payments to members of the Indian 
tribe only if-
(A) the Indian tribe has prepared a plan to allocate revenues to uses 
authorized by paragraph (2)(B); 
(B) the plan is approved by the Secretary as adequate, particularly with 
respect to uses described in clause (i) or (iii) of paragraph (2)(B); 
(C) the interests of minors and other legally incompetent persons who are 
entitled to receive any of the per capita payments are protected and preserved and 
the per capita payments are disbursed to the parents or legal guardian of such 
minors or legal incompetents in such amounts as may be necessary for the health, 
education, or welfare, of the minor or other legally incompetent person under a 
plan approved by the Secretary and the governing body of the Indian tribe; and 
(D) the per capita payments are subject to Federal taxation and tribes 
notify members of such tax liability when payments are made. 
( 4) (A) A tribal ordinance or resolution may provide for the licensing or 
regulation of class II gaming activities owned by any person or entity other than 
the Indian tribe and conducted on Indian lands, only if the tribal licensing 
requirements include the requirements described in the subclauses of 
subparagraph (B)(i) and are at least as restrictive as those established by State law 
governing similar gaming within the jurisdiction of the State within which such 
Indian lands are located. No person or entity, other than the Indian tribe, shall be 
eligible to receive a tribal license to own a class II gaming activity conducted on 
Indian lands within the jurisdiction of the Indian tribe if such person or entity 
would not be eligible to receive a State license to conduct the same activity within 
the jurisdiction of the State. 
(B) (i) The provisions of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph and the 
provisions of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (2) shall not bar the 
continued operation of an individually owned class II gaming operation 
that was operating on September 1, 1986, if--
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(I) such gaming operation is licensed and regulated by an 
Indian tribe pursuant to an ordinance reviewed and approved by 
the Commission in accordance with section 2712 of this title, 
(II) income to the Indian tribe from such gaming is used 
only for the purposes described in paragraph (2)(B) of this 
subsection, 
(III) not less than 60 percent of the net revenues is income 
to the Indian tribe, and 
(IV) the owner of such gaming operation pays an 
appropriate assessment to the National Indian Gaming 
Commission under section 2717(a)(l) of this title for regulation of 
such gaming. 
(ii) The exemption from the application of this subsection provided 
under this subparagraph may not be transfeffed to any person or entity and 
shall remain in effect only so long as the gaming activity remains within 
the same nature and scope as operated on October 17, 1988. 
(iii) Within sixty days of October 17, 1988, the Secretary shall prepare a 
list of each individually owned gaming operation to which clause (i) 
applies and shall publish such list in the Federal Register. 
(c) Issuance of gaming license; certificate of self-regulation 
(1) The Commission may consult with appropriate law enforcement officials 
concerning gaming licenses issued by an Indian tribe and shall have thirty days to notify 
the Indian tribe of any objections to issuance of such license. 
(2) If, after the issuance of a gaming license by an Indian tribe, reliable 
information is received from the Commission indicating that a primary management 
official or key employee does not meet the standard established under subsection 
(b )(2)(F)(ii)(II) of this section, the Indian tribe shall suspend such license and, after 
notice and hearing, may revoke such license. 
(3) Any Indian tribe which operates a class II gaming activity a11d which--
(A) has continuously conducted such activity for a period of not less than 
three years, including at least one year after October 17, 1988; and 
(B) has otherwise complied with the provisions of this section 
may petition the Commission for a certificate of self-regulation. 
( 4) The Commission shall issue a certificate of self-regulation if it determines 
from available information, and after a hearing if requested by the tribe, that the tribe has-
(A) conducted its gaming activity in a manner which--
(i) has resulted in an effective and honest accounting of all 
revenues; 
(ii) has resulted in a reputation for safe, fair, and honest operation 
of the activity; and 
(iii) has been generally free of evidence of criminal or dishonest 
activity; 
(B) adopted and is implementing adequate systems for--
(i) accounting for all revenues from the activity; 
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(ii) investigation, licensing, and monitoring of all employees of the 
gaming activity; and 
(iii) investigation, enforcement and prosecution of violations of its 
gaming ordinance and regulations; and 
(C) conducted the operation on a fiscally and economically sound basis. 
(5) During any year in which a tribe has a certificate for self-regulation--
(A) the tribe shall not be subject to the provisions of paragraphs (I), (2), 
(3), and (4) of section 2706 (b) of this title; 
(B) the tribe shall continue to submit an annual independent audit as 
required by subsection (b)(2)(C) of this section and shall submit to the 
Commission a complete resume on all employees hired and licensed by the tribe 
subsequent to the issuance of a certificate of self-regulation; and 
(C) the Commission may not assess a fee on such activity pursuant to 
section 2717 of this title in excess of one quarter of 1 per centum of the gross 
revenue. 
(6) The Commission may, for just cause and after an opportnnity for a hearing, 
remove a certificate of self-regulation by majority vote of its members. 
( d) Class III gaming activities; authorization; revocation; Tribal-State compact 
(1) Class III gaming activities shall be lawful on Indian lands only if such 
activities are-
(A) authorized by an ordinance or resolution that--
(i) is adopted by the governing body of the Indian tribe having 
jurisdiction over such lands, 
(ii) meets the requirements of subsection (b) of this section, and 
(iii) is approved by the Chairman, 
(B) located in a State that permits such gan1ing for any purpose by any 
person, organization, or entity, and 
(C) conducted in conformance with a Tribal-State compact entered into by 
the Indian tribe and the State under paragraph (3) that is in effect. 
(2) (A) If any Indian tribe proposes to engage in, or to authorize any 
person or entity to engage in, a class III gaming activity on Indian lands of the 
Indian tribe, the governing body of the Indian tribe shall adopt and submit to the 
Chairman an ordinance or resolution that meets the requirements of subsection (b) 
of this section. 
(B) The Chairman shall approve any ordinance or resolution described in 
subparagraph (A), unless the Chairman specifically determines that-
(i) the ordinance or resolution was not adopted in compliance with 
the governing documents of the Indian tribe, or 
(ii) the tribal governing body was significantly and unduly 
influenced in the adoption of such ordinance or resolution by any person 
identified in section 271 l(e)(l)(D) of this title. 
Upon the approval of such an ordinance or resolution, the Chairman shall 
publish in the Federal Register such ordinance or resolution and the order 
of approval. 
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(C) Effective with the publication under subparagraph (B) of an ordinance 
or resolution adopted by the governing body of an Indian tribe that has been 
approved by the Chairman under subparagraph (B), class III gaming activity on 
the Indian lands of the Indian tribe shall be fully subject to the terms and 
conditions of the Tribal-State compact entered into under paragraph (3) by the 
Indian tribe that is in effect. 
(D) (i) The governing body of an Indian tribe, in its sole discretion and 
without the approval of the Chairman, may adopt an ordinance or 
resolution revoking any prior ordinance or resolution that authorized class 
III gaming on the Indian lands of the Indian tribe. Such revocation shall 
render class III gaming illegal on the Indian lands of such Indian tribe. 
(ii) The Indian tribe shall submit any revocation ordinance or 
resolution described in clause (i) to the Chairman. The Chairman shall 
publish such ordinance or resolution in the Federal Register and the 
revocation provided by such ordinance or resolution shall take effect on 
the date of such publication. 
(iii) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subsection--
(!) any person or entity operating a class III gaming activity 
pursuant to this paragraph on the date on which an ordinance or 
resolution described in clause (i) that revokes authorization for 
such class Ill gaming activity is published in the Federal Register 
may, during the I-year period beginning on the date on which such 
revocation ordinance or resolution is published under clause (ii), 
continue to operate such activity in conformance with the Tribal-
State compact entered into under paragraph (3) that is in effect, and 
(II) any civil action that arises before, and any crime that is 
committed before, the close of such ]-year period shall not be 
affected by such revocation ordinance or resolution. 
(3) (A) Any Indian tribe having jurisdiction over the Indian lands upon 
which a class III gaming activity is being conducted, or is to be conducted, shall 
request the State in which such lands are located to enter into negotiations for the 
purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact governing the conduct of gaming 
activities. Upon receiving such a request, the State shall negotiate with the Indian 
tribe in good faith to enter into such a compact. 
(B) Any State and any Indian tribe may enter into a Tribal-State compact 
governing gaming activities on the Indian lands of the Indian tribe, but such 
compact shall take effect only when notice of approval by the Secretary of such 
compact has been published by the Secretary in the Federal Register. 
(C) Any Tribal-State compact negotiated under subparagraph (A) may 
include provisions relating to-
(i) the application of the criminal and civil laws and regulations of 
the Indian tribe or the State that are directly related to, and necessary for, 
the licensing and regulation of such activity; 
(ii) the allocation of criminal and civil jurisdiction between the 
State and the Indian tribe necessary for the enforcement of such laws and 
regulations; 
7 
(iii) the assessment by the State of such activities in such amounts 
as are necessary to defray the costs of regulating snch activity; 
(iv) taxation by the Indian tribe of such activity in amounts 
comparable to amounts assessed by the State for comparable activities; 
(v) remedies for breach of contract; 
(vi) standards for the operation of such activity and maintenance of 
the gaming facility, including licensing; and 
(vii) any other subjects that are directly related to the operation of 
gaming activities. 
( 4) Except for any assessments that may be agreed to under paragraph (3)(C)(iii) 
of this subsection, nothing in this section shall be interpreted as conferring upon a 
State or any of its political subdivisions authority to impose any tax, fee, charge, 
or other assessment upon an Indian tribe or upon any other person or entity 
authorized by an Indian tribe to engage in a class III activity. No State may refuse 
to enter into the negotiations described in paragraph (3)(A) based upon the lack of 
authority in such State, or its political subdivisions, to impose such a tax, fee, 
charge, or other assessment. 
(5) Nothing in this subsection shall impair the right of an Indian tribe to regulate 
class Ill gaming on its Indian lands concurrently with the State, except to the 
extent that such regulation is inconsistent with, or less stringent than, the State 
laws and regulations made applicable by any Tribal-State compact entered into by 
the Indian tribe under paragraph (3) that is in effect. 
(6) The provisions of section 1175 of Title 15 shall not apply to any gaming 
conducted under a Tribal-State compact that--
(A) is entered into under paragraph (3) by a State in which gambling 
devices are legal, and 
(B) is in effect. 
(7) (A) The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction over--
(i) any cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the 
failure of a State to enter into negotiations with the Indian tribe for the 
purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact under paragraph (3) or to 
conduct such negotiations in good faith, 
(ii) any cause of action initiated by a State or Indian tribe to enjoin 
a class III gaming activity located on Indian lands and conducted in 
violation of any Tribal-State compact entered into under paragraph (3) that 
is in effect, and 
(iii) any cause of action initiated by the Secretary to enforce the 
procedures prescribed under subparagraph (B)(vii). 
(B) (i) An Indian tribe may initiate a cause of action described in 
subparagraph (A)(i) only after the close of the 180-day period beginning 
on the date on which the Indian tribe requested the State to enter into 
negotiations under paragraph (3)(A). 
(ii) In any action described in subparagraph (A)(i), upon the 
introduction of evidence by an Indian tribe that-
(!) a Tribal-State compact has not been entered into 
under paragraph (3 ), and 
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(II) the State did not respond to the request of the 
Indian tribe to negotiate such a compact or did not respond 
to such request in good faith, 
the burden of proof shall be upon the State to prove that the State 
has negotiated with the Indian tribe in good faith to conclude a 
Tribal-State compact governing the conduct of gaming activities. 
(iii) If, in any action described in subparagraph (A)(i), the 
court finds that the State has failed to negotiate in good faith with 
the Indian tribe to conclude a Tribal-State compact governing the 
conduct of gaming activities, the court shall order the State and the 
Indian Tribe [FN2) to conclude such a compact within a 60-day 
period. In determining in such an action whether a State has 
negotiated in good faith, the comi--
(1) may take into account the public interest, public 
safety, criminality, financial integrity, and adverse 
economic impacts on existing gaming activities, and 
(II) shall consider any demand by the State for 
direct taxation of the Indian tribe or of any Indian lands as 
evidence that the State has not negotiated in good faith. 
(iv) If a State and an Indian tribe fail to conclude a Tribal-
State compact governing the conduct of gaming activities on the 
Indian lands subject to the jurisdiction of such Indian tribe within 
the 60-day period provided in the order of a court issued under 
clause (iii), the Indian tribe and the State shall each submit to a 
mediator appointed by the court a proposed compact that 
represents their last best offer for a compact. The mediator shall 
select from the two proposed compacts the one which best 
comports with the terms of this chapter and any other applicable 
Federal law and with the findings and order of the court. 
(v) The mediator appointed by the court under clause (iv) 
shall submit to the State and the Indian tribe the compact selected 
by the mediator under clause (iv). 
(vi) If a State consents to a proposed compact during the 
60-day period beginning on the date on which the proposed 
compact is submitted by the mediator to the State under clause (v), 
the proposed compact shall be treated as a Tribal-State compact 
entered into under paragraph (3). 
(vii) If the State does not consent during the 60-day period 
described in clause (vi) to a proposed compact submitted by a 
mediator under clause ( v ), the mediator shall notify the Secretary 
and the Secretary shall prescribe, in consultation with the Indian 
tribe, procedures--
(1) which are consistent with the proposed compact 
selected by the mediator under clause (iv), the provisions of 
this chapter, and the relevant provisions of the laws of the 
State, and 
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(II) under which class III gaming may be conducted on the 
Indian lands over which the Indian tribe has jurisdiction. 
(8) (A) The Secretary is authorized to approve any Tribal-State compact 
entered into between an Indian tribe and a State governing gaming on Indian 
lands of such Indian tribe. 
(B) The Secretary may disapprove a compact described in subparagraph 
(A) only if such compact violates--
(i) any provision of this chapter, 
(ii) any other provision of Federal law that does not relate to 
jurisdiction over gaming on Indian lands, or 
(iii) the trust obligations of the United States to Indians. 
(C) If the Secretary does not approve or disapprove a compact described 
in subparagraph (A) before the date that is 45 days after the date on which the 
compact is submitted to the Secretary for approval, the compact shall be 
considered to have been approved by the Secretary, but only to the extent the 
compact is consistent with the provisions of this chapter. 
(D) The Secretary shall publish in the Federal Register notice of any 
Tribal-State compact that is approved, or considered to have been approved, 
under this paragraph. 
(9) An Indian tribe may enter into a management contract for the operation of a 
class III gaming activity if such contract has been submitted to, and approved by, 
the Chairman. The Chairman's review and approval of such contract shall be 
governed by the provisions of subsections (b), (c), (d), (f), (g), and (h) of section 
2711 of this title. 
( e) Approval of ordinances 
For purposes of this section, by not later than the date that is 90 days after the date on 
which any tribal gaming ordinance or resolution is submitted to the Chairman, the 
Chairman shall approve such ordinance or resolution if it meets the requirements of this 
section. Any such ordinance or resolution not acted upon at the end of that 90-day period 
shall be considered to have been approved by the Chairman, but only to the extent such 
ordinance or resolution is consistent with the provisions of this chapter. 
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18 U.S.C. § 1166. Gambling in Indian country 
(a) Subject to subsection (c), for purposes of Federal law, all State laws pertaining to the 
licensing, regulation, or prohibition of gambling, including but not limited to criminal 
sanctions applicable thereto, shall apply in Indian country in the same manner and to the 
same extent as such laws apply elsewhere in the State. 
(b) Whoever in Indian country is guilty of any act or omission involving gambling, 
whether or not conducted or sanctioned by an Indian tribe, which, although not made 
punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be punishable if committed or omitted 
within the jurisdiction of the State in which the act or omission occurred, under the laws 
governing the licensing, regulation, or prohibition of gambling in force at the time of 
such act or omission, shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to a like punishment. 
(c) For the purpose of this section, the term "gambling" does not include-
(!) class I gaming or class II gaming regulated by the Indian Gaming Regulatory 
Act, or 
(2) class III gaming conducted under a Tribal-State compact approved by the 
Secretary of the Interior under section 11 ( d)(8) of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act that 
is in effect. 
(d) The United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions of 
violations of State gambling laws that are made applicable under this section to Indian 
country, unless an Indian tribe pursuant to a Tribal-State compact approved by the 
Secretary of the Interior under section 11 ( d)(8) of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, or 
under any other provision of Federal law, has consented to the transfer to the State of 
criminal jurisdiction with respect to gambling on the lands of the Indian tribe. 
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ADDENDUMC 
SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE 
SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES AND STATE OF IDAHO 
CLASS III GAMING COMPACT 
SECTIONS 1-6 AND 18-29 
t 
THE SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES 
and the 
STATE OF IDAHO 
COMP ACT FOR CLASS ill GAMING 
THIS TRIBAL-STATE COMPACT made and .entered into by and between the 
Shoshone-Bannock Tribes (hereinafter the "Tribes"), a fe~ally recognized Indian Tribe, 
and the State of Idaho (hereinafter the "State") pursuant to the provisions of the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act (hereinafter the "Act"), Pub. L. 100-497, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701, et 
seq., and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168. 
1. Title 
This document shall be referred to as "The Shoshone-Bannock Tribes and the 
State ofldaho Compact for Class ID Gaming." 
2. Definitions 
For purposes of this Compact: 
a. "Act" means the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. 100-497, 25 
U.S.C. §§ 2701, et seq., and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168. 
b. "Business Council" means the Fort Hall Business Council, which is the 
elected governing body of the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes. 
c. "Class ID gaming" means all fonns of gaming set forth in Sections 4 and 5 
ofthls Compact that are not Class I or Class II as defined in Sections 4(6) and 4(7) of the 
Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2703(6) and (7). 
d. "Compact" means the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes and the State of Idaho 
Compact for Class ID Gaming. 
e. ''Distributor" means a person who distributes any machines or devices of 
any kind used for any gaming activity in the gaming facility. 
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f. "Finding of suitability" means an approval granted to a person or enterprise 
directly or indirectly involved with the gaming operation and relates only to the specified 
involvement for which it was made. If the nature of the involvement changes from that 
for which the applicant is found suitable, the Tribal Gaming Agency may require the 
person or enterprise to submit for a determination of suitability in the new capacity. 
g. "Gaming employee" means any person employed in the operation or 
management of· the gaming operation, whether employed by the Tribes or by any 
enterprise providing onsite services to the Tribes within the gaming facility. 
h. "Gaming facility" or "gaming facilities" means the land together with all 
buildings, improvements and facilities used or maintained in connection with tbe conduct 
of Class IlI gaming on Indian Lands as provided by this Compact. 
i. "Gaming operation" means the Tribes' operation of Class Ill gaming in any 
gaming facility. 
· J. ''Indian Lands" means those lands within the Tribes' jurisdictional limits 
that meet the definition of "Indian lands" as defined in the Indian Gaming Regulatory 
Act. 
k. ''License" means an approval or certification issued by the Tribal Gaming 
Commission to any person or entity involved in the gaming operation or in the providing 
of gaming services to the gaming operation. 
/. "Licensee" means any person or entity who has been approved, licensed, 
certified or found suitable by the Tribal Gaming Commission to be involved in the 
gaming operation or in the providing of gaming services in the gaming operation. 
m. "Net gaming revenue" means gross revenues of an Indian gaming activity 
less amounts paid out as, or paid for, prizes and total operating expenses, excluding 
management fees. 
n. ''NIGC" means the National Indian Gaming Commission· established 




o. "Ordinance" means the ordinance adopted by the Tribes and approved by 
theNIGC. 
p. "State" means the State of Idaho, its authorized officials, agents and 
representatives. 
q. "State Gaming Agency" means the Idaho agency designated by the State by 
written notice to the Tribes as the single state agency primarily responsible for fulfilling 
the obligations of this Compact. 
r. "Tribal Gaming Commission" means the agency of the Tribes primarily 
responsible for regulatory oversight of Class ill gaming. 
s. "Tribal law enforcement agency" means the police force of the Tribes, 
established and maintained by the Tribes, pursuant to the Tribes' powers of self-
government, to carry out law enforcement on Indian Lands. 
t. "Tribes" or "Tribal" means of or stemming from the Shoshone-Bannock 
Tribes, its authorized officials, agents and representatives acting on the Tribes' behalf 
pursuant to Tribal law. 
3. Recitals 
a. WHEREAS, the Tribes and the State recognize and respect the laws and 
authority of the respective parties; and 
b. WHEREAS, it is the intent of the Tribes and the State that the provisions of 
this Compact, including but not limited to the resolution process outlined herein, apply to 
and control only the issues arising from the terms and provisions of this Compact. · 
b. WHEREAS, the Congress of the United States has enacted into law the Act, 
Pub. L. 100-497, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701, et seq., and 18 U.S.C. §§ I 166-1168, which 
provides in part that a tribal state compact may be negotiated between a tribe and a state 
to govern the conduct of certain Class ID gaming activities on Indian Lands· of tribes 
within the state; and 
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c. WHEREAS, the Tribes and the State have negotiated the terms and 
conditions of this Compact in good faith so as to provide for mutual governmental 
purposes and to provide a regulatory framework for the operation of certain Class Ill 
gaming, which is intended to: (a) ensure the fair and honest operation of such gaming 
activities; (b) maintain the integrity of all activities conducted in regard to such gaming 
activities; ( c) prevent unsavory and unsuitable persons from having any direct or indirect 
involvement with gaming activities at any time or in any capacily; ( d) establish and 
maintain responsible accounting practices and procedures; ( e) maintain effective control 
over the financial practices related to gaming activities, including establishing the 
minimum procedures for internal fiscal affairs and the safeguarding of assets and 
revenues and reliable recordkeeping; (f) prevent cheating and fraudulent practices; and 
(g) protect the health; welfare and safety of the citizens of the Tribes and of the State; and 
d. WHEREAS, the Act provides that an Indian tribe may conduct Class III 
gaming as provided in IGRA; and 
e. WHEREAS, the Shoshone:Bannock Tribes and the State of Idaho have 
mutually agreed that the conduct of Class Ill gaming under the terms and conditions set 
forth below will benefit the Tribes and protect the citizens of the Tribes and of the State 
consistent with the objectives of the Act; and 
f. WHEREAS, the parties hereto deem it to be in their respective best 
interests to enter into this Compact; and 
g. WHEREAS, a principal goal of federal Indian policy is to promote tribal 
economic development, tribal self-determination and a strong government to government 
relationship; and 
h. WHEREAS, the State recognizes the Tribes' sovereign rights to control 
gaming activities on Indian Lands as provided by the Act and this Compact; and 
i. WHEREAS, it is the policy of the Tribes to exercise and retain its rights to 
regulate gaming activities upon its lands and reservation for the purposes of encouraging 
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Tribal employment, economic and social development, and funding of Tribal services 
while ensuring the fair and lawful operation of gaming and the prevention of corrupt and 
criminal influences. The Tribes will utilize net revenues generated by gaming to fund 
programs that provide import;uit'governmental services to Tribal members and reservation 
residents. These programs include education, health and human resources, housing 
development, road construction and maintenance, sewer and water projects, police, fire, 
judicial services, economic development, and any other purpose authorized under the Act; 
and 
j. WHEREAS, it is a goal of this Compact 1hat positive economic effects of 
such gaming will extend beyond Indian Lands to the Tribes' neighbors and surrounding 
communities and help to foster mutual respect and understanding among Indians and non-
Indians; and 
k. WHEREAS, this Compact shall govern the licensing, regulation and 
operation of Class ill gaming conducted by the Tribes on Indian Lands located within the 
State; and 
I. WHEREAS, the State and 1he Tribes are empowered to enter into this 
Compact due to their inherent power to contract and pursuant to the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act; and 
m. WHEREAS, it is also understood that prior to becoming effective the State 
shall obtain legislative authorization to waive its inununity as provided under the 
Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Tribes shall obtain 
authorization to waive their sovereign inununity. The signatories will certify that this 
authorization has. been obtained; and 
n. WHEREAS, the parties have been unable to agree upon the types of Class 
Ill games permitted by the Act to be played by the Tribes; and 
o. WHEREAS, The State takes the position that the Indian Gaming Regulatory 
Act authorizes Class m gaming activities on Indian Lands only if such activities are 
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provided for in a compact such as this and if other persons or entities in the State of Idaho 
are permitted by state law to engage in such activities. Accordingly, the only tribal Class 
III gaming activities that are legal in Idaho under federal law are those Class III gaming 
activities permitted by article 3, section 20 of the Idaho Constitution and not otherwise 
contrary to the criminal laws of the State of Idaho. Therefore, pursuant to federal law, 
tribal Class III gaming in Idaho is contrary to public policy and is strictly· prohibited 
except for a lottery, pari-mutual betting and bingo or raffle games conducted in 
conformity with enabling legislation. Furthermore, no gaming activity shall employ any 
form of casino gambling including, but not limited to, blackjack, craps, roulette, poker, 
baccarat, keno and slot machines, or employ any electronic or electromechanical 
imitation or simulation of any form of casino gambling; and 
p. WHEREAS, it is the position of the State that the electronic gaming 
currently conducted by the Tribes in Idaho is an imitation of casino games and prohibited 
by Idaho and federal law; and 
q. \VHEREAS, the Tribes take the position that under federal law, the Tribes 
are entitled to offer any gaming activity that is otherwise permitted by any person, 
organization, or entity for any purpose. Given the range and scope of gaming activities, 
with an emphasis on a multi-faceted state-sponsored entity, the State of Idaho cannot 
establish that any gaming activity, properly regulated to. ensure the integrity of the game 
and protect the gaming patron, contravenes the State ofldaho's public policy for gaming. 
Further, in light of traditional understandings of the context and legislative history of Act, 
the State cannot establish that it has reasonably characterized the relevant state laws as 
completely prohibiting a distinct form of gaming. Accordingly, the Tribes are entitled to 
offer and regulate all forms of gaming except sports-betting; and 
r. WHEREAS, the Tribes take the alternative position that if the State does 
establish that it has met the above-stated burden through the application of the Idaho State 
Constitution, article 3, section 20, the Tribes are entitled to offer electronic facsimiles of 
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any lottery game which can be reasonably defined as gaming owned arid operated by 
government entities, or as games wherein the state/owner does not have a stake in the 
outcome of the game of chance; and 
s. WHEREAS, both the Tribes and the State acknowledge that these are legal 
issues that should be resolved. fu recognition of this, the Tribes and the Sta1e agree in 
this Compact to resolve issues that can be agreed upon and agree to establish a process 
for resolving the disputed matters. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual undertakings and agreements 
hereinafter set forth, the Tribes and the State enter into the following Compact. 
4. Authorized Class III Gaming 
Class ID Gaming shall be authorized consistent with the following: 
a. Gaming Authorized. Following approval of this Compact as provided in 
the Act, the Tribes may operate in its gaming facilities located on fudian Lands, any 
gaming activity that the State of Idaho "pennits for any purpose by any person, 
organization, or entity," as the phrase is interpreted in the context of the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act. The Tribes may not operate any other fonn of Class ill gaming activity. 
b. Location of Class ill Gaming Activities. Class ill gaming activities· shall 
only be conducted on Indian Lands located within the exterior boundaries of the Fort Hall 
Indian Reservation as it existed as of the date of enactment of the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act or upon other Indian Lands as defined in the Indian Gaming Regulatory 
Act with the approval of the Governor. Nothing herein shall be interpreted as precluding 
a Governor from deciding whether to concur with the findings of the Secretary of the 
Interior that gaming on newly acquired lands would be in the best interest of the 
Shoshone-Bannock Tribes and not detrimental to the surrounding community. 
c. Certification. Subsequent to a final non-appealable judgment in the initial 
Declaratory Judgment Action pursuant to Section 5, no gaming device shall be placed in 
the gaming facility for use until approved by the State. The Tribe shall make a good faith 
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effort to remove any devices tl!at are in play at the time of the final non-appealable 
judgment that do not comply with the Declaratory Judgment. The State shall make a 
good faith effort to certify those games that are in play at the time of the non-appealable 
judgment that do comply. with the Declaratory Judgment. If tl!e parties disagree over 
games tlmt rue in play at the time of the final non-appealable Judgment, the I nbes may 
continue to operate the games pending dispute resolution per Section 18. 
d. FolDlS of Payment. All payment for wagers made in gaming c;onducted by 
the Tribes in their gaming operation shall be made by cash, chips or tokens. The gaming 
operation shall not extend credit. Chips or tokens may only be purchased using cash, 
checks or travelers checks. 
e. Prohibited Activities. The Tribes shall limit their Class Ill gaming activities 
to those permitted by this Compact. In the event a dispute arises after the completion of 
the declaratory judgment action, and the implementation thereof as agreed to in Section 5, 
over whether an activity is or is not permitted under this Compact, the dispute shall be 
resolved pursuant to Section 18. 
f. Advertising of Authorized Gaming. The Tribes may advertise their 
authorized gaming activities within the State of Idaho in an honest and truthful manner 
pursuantto federal law. 
5. Initial Declaratory Judgment Action 
The Tribes and the State agree that issues of what gaming the Tribes may conduct 
under the Act and what restrictions on the operations, if any, may be imposed by the 
State, are ultimately questions of law. However, the parties believe that presentation of 
facts regarding the actual gaming activity that does occur in the State and on Indian Lands 
and the machines that are at issue is necessary for the Court to resolve the questions of 
law.· 
a. Positions of Parties as to Jurisdiction 
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(1) It is the Tribes' position that the Act has vested exclusive jurisdiction 
in the United States District Courts to resolve disputes under the Act. 
(2) The State does not consent to jurisdiction of the federal .court over 
any claims under 25 USC 27IO(d)(7)(A)(i). The State does reserve the right to consent to 
federal court jurisdiction over claims arising under this compact on a case-by-case basis. 
b. Agreement to Participate in Initial Declaratory · Judgment Action. 
Notwithstanding these positions, the Tribes and the State agree that either or both parties 
may file suit for declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for the District 
of Idaho naming the other as a defendant and seeking a declaration of the legal issues 
disputed in this Section. In pursuing this action: 
(I) Both parties al?)"ee that they have obtained the necessary legislative 
and legal authority to bring the initial declaratory judgment action, merge declaratory 
judgment actions, or take other steps as may be necessary to participate in such an action 
on its merits. This agreement shall not in any way prejudice any right to appeal or seek 
review of any judgment. 
(2) Both parties agree to expedite the proceedings and any appeal or 
review of any final order or judgment entered in such initial declaratory judgment action. 
(3) Should the Tribes refuse to consent to jurisdiction as provided 
above, this Compact shall be null and void. 
(4) Should the State refuse to consent to jurisdiction as provided above, 
any issue relating to the provisions of this Compact presented by the Tribes in their 
complaint or pleading shall be deemed to have been decided in favor of the Tribes' 
position on the issue. 
(5) The Tribes agree to limit the scope of their gaming activities to those 
set forth in Section 4. 
(6) This provision shall not be construed as a consent by the State to 
federal court jurisdiction in any action brought pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i). 
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c. Implementation of Initial Declaratory Judgment Decision. Upon the 
conclusion of all legal proceedings in the initial declaratory judgment action brought 
. pursuant to Section 5, including the conclusion of all appeals or review, the appropriate 
provisions below shall apply: 
(l) In the event the court(s) detennines that certain gaming activities are 
not "permitted" in . the· context of the Act, the Tribes shall be precluded from offering 
those gaming activities in any gaming facilities on Indian Lands. 
(2) In the event the court(s) deteimines that certain gaming activities are 
"pennitted gaming" in the context of the Act, the Tribes shall be entitled to expedited 
implementation of such games as is consistent with the judgment. For this purpose, the 
Tribes may conduct such games as are consistent with that judgment upon conclusion of 
the expedited negotiations and/or arbitration set forth below. · 
(A) The parties agree to expedited negotiation of any issues which 
are proper subjects of negotiation under the Act consistent with the judicial resolution. 
Such. issues shall be negotiated for thirty (30) days. For purposes of this section, "day" 
shall mean calendar day. Agreements reached in mediation shall have the same effect as 
if a part of this Compact, and are incorporated in full herein. 
(B) If agreement cannot be reached, such issues shall be 
submitted to binding arbitration as follows: 
(i) Either party shall serve written notice of intent to 
arbitrate on the other party on the fmal day of negotiation. The party serving notice of 
intent to arbitrate shall identify the specific provision(s) of this Compact anclfor issues, 
which shall be submitted for arbitration. 
(ii) Both parties shall within five (5) days of notice of 
intent to arbitrate provide a list of five (5) names of individuals available as prospective 
arbitrators. Each party shall, within five (5) days of the receipt of the other party's list, 
select a person from that list as an arbitrator. Within ten (10) days of their selection, 
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these two individuals shall select a third arbitrator from a list of not less than five (5) 
nominees from an independent arbitrators' or alternative dispute resolution organization. 
If the individuals do not agree upon such organization, it shall be the American 
Arbitration Association. The State and the Tribes agree that the arbitrators shall be 
required to submit their decision within ninety (90) days of the selection of the third 
arbitrator. 
(iii) The arbitrators shall have authority to issue such orders 
and decisions as shall be reasonably necessary or desirable to bring about an expeditious 
decision consistent With the judicial decision made in the initial declaratory judgment 
action brought pursuant to Section 5. 
(iv) Except as provided by Section 4, the Tribes agree not 
to conduct games pursuant to Section 4 until the completion of arbitration. However, if 
conclusion of the arbitration process is delayed for any reason, the arbitrators may permit 
gaming on such terms as they determine pending conclusion of arbitration. 
(v) Arbitration expenses will be billed. equally to the 
respective parties. 
{vi) If judicial review of an arbitration decision is sought, 
the arbitration decision shall be effective unless and until detennined otherwise by a 
federal court. 
(vii) Except as may be determined by a federal court, 
arbitration decisions shall have the same effect as if a part of tl:ris Compact, and are 
incorporated in full herein. 
(viii) Nothing herein shall preclude the parties from agreeing 
to an alternate form of dispute resolution. 
(C) To ensure integrity, the Tribes agree that if additional games 
are permitted pursuant to the initial declaratory judgment action, such games shall be 
conducted in accordance with the operational, security, cash control and other standards 
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established in this Compact together with additional negotiated standards as restrictive as 
those of the National Indian Gaming Commission as set forth at 25 CFR 542 as published 
in the Federal Register, January 5, 1999, or the Nevada Gaming Commission for that 
particular game. Such restrictions shall be negotiated and/or arbitrated in the manner 
provided in Section 5( c). 
6. Regulations and Ordinances Regulating the Operation and Management of the 
Gaming Operation 
The Tribal Gaming Commission or the Business Council may, from time to time, 
adopt, amend or repeal such regulations or ordinances consistent with the policy, 
objectives, purposes and terms of this Compact as it may deem necessary or desirable in 
the interests of the Tribes and the State in carrying out the policy and provisions of this 
Compact. The Tribes have enacted an ordinance regulating the operation and 
management of the Gaming operation. 
7. Background Investigations of Gaming Employees . 
a. Background Investigation Pnor to Employment. 
(!) Prior to hiring or licensing a prospective gaming employee, the 
Tribal Gaming Commission shall obtain sufficient information and identification from the 
applicant on forms to be furnished by the Tribal Gaming Commission to permit a 
thorough background investigation, together with such fees as may be required by the 
Tribes. The information obtained shall include, at a minimum, name (including any 
aliases), current address, date and place of birth, criminal arrest and conviction record, 
social security number, two sets of fingerprints, sex, height, weight, and two current 
photographs. Upon written request by the State, true and correct copies of this 
information shall be provided to the designated State agency, which may. conduct an 
independent background investigation at the State's own expense and provide a written 
report to the Tribal Gaming Commission regarding each application. 
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a. Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction. Except as limited by subsection (c) below, in 
enforcing the terms and provisions of this Compact and any ordinance implementing the 
Compact, the Tribes shall exercise exclusive criminal jurisdiction over Indians. 
b. State Criminal Jurisdiction. Except as limited by subsection ( c) below, in 
enforcing the negotiated terms and provisions of this Compact, the State shall exercise 
exclusive criminal jurisdiction over non-fudians. The Tribes agree to cooperate with the 
State in any criminal investigation being conducted pursuant to this subsection and to 
provide any information in the Tribes' possession relative to a criminal proceeding being 
conducted by the State. For purposes of State enforcement, all State criminal laws and 
such Jaws as hereafter amended pertaining to the licensing, regulation or prohibition of 
gaming and gambling which are not inconsistent with this Compact, including the 
sanctions associated with such Jaws, are adopted and incorporated herein by reference. 
c. Federal Criminal Jurisdiction. Nothing contained herein shall be deemed to 
modify or limit existing federal criminal jurisdiction over the Gaming operation 
negotiated under this Compact or over individuals who commit gaming-related offenses. 
18. General Dispute Resolution 
The following resolution process, including but not limited to the judicial 
resolution process, shall apply exclusively for the resolution of issues arising under the 
provisions of this Compact. 
a. Compliance. If either party believes the designated representative of the 
other party has failed to comply with any of the provisions of this Compact, it shall 
invoke the following procedure: 
(1) Informal Dispute Resolution. 
(A) The party asserting noncompliance shall serve written notice 
upon the other party. The party asserting the noncompHance shall identify the specific 
provision of this Compact alleged to have been violated and shall specify the factual basis 
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thereof. The State and the Tribes shall thereafter meet within ten (10) days in an effort to 
resolve the dispute. 
(B) If the dispute is not resolved to the satisfaction of the parties 
within thirty (30) days after the service of the notice set forth above,, either party may 
pursue the remedies below: 
(2) Arbitration. 
If agreement cannot be reached, such issues shall be submitted to 
binding arbitration as follows: 
(A) Either party shall serve written notice of intent to arbitrate on 
· the other party on the final day of negotiation. The· party serving notice of intent to 
arbitrate shall identify the specific provision(s) of this Compact and/or issues, which shall 
be submitted for arbitration. 
(B) · Both parties shall within five (5) days of notice of intent to 
arbitrate provide a list of five (5) names of individuals available as prospective 
arbitrators. Each party shall, within five (5) days of the receipt of the other party's list, 
select a person from that list as an arbitrator. Within ten (10) days of their selection, 
these two individuals shall select a third arbitrator from a list of not less than five ( 5) 
nominees from an independent arbitrators' or alternative dispute resolution organization. 
ff the individuals do not agree upon such organization, it shall be the American 
Arbitration Association. The State and the Tribes agree that the arbitrators shall be 
required to submit their decision within ninety (90) days of the selection of the third 
arbitrator. 
(C) The arbitrators shall have authority to issue such orders and 
decisions as shall be reasonably necessary or desirable to bring about an expeditious 
decision consistent with the judicial decision made in the initial declaratory judgment 
action brought pursuant to Section 5. 
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(D) Except as provided by Section 4, the Tribes agree not to 
conduct games pursuant to Section 5(c)(2) until the completion of arbitration. However, 
if conclusion of the arbitration process is delayed for any reason, the arbitrators may 
permit gaming on such terms as they detennine pending conclusion of arbitration. 
(E) Arbitration expenses will be billed equally to the respective 
parties. 
(F) Except as may be detennined by a federal court, arbitration 
decisions shall have the same effect as if a part of this Compact, and are incorporated in 
full herein. They shall be in effect unless and until. determined otherwise by a federal 
court. 
(G) Nothing herein shall preclude the parties from agreeing to an 
alternate form of dispute resolution. 
(3) Judicial Resolution. 
(A) Upon completion of the infonnal dispute resolution process of 
subsection (1) and (2), both the State and the Tribes consent to the jurisdiction of the 
United States Federal Court, District of Idaho, for the resolution of any dispute arising 
from activities governed by this Compact. 
(B) If the Tribes do not consent to federal court jurisdiction with 
respect to any action brought by the State of Idaho to enforce the provisions of this 
Compact, the State shall notify the Secretary of the Interior of that fact and shall mail a 
copy of said notice to the NIGC and the Tribes. This Compact shall be null and void five 
(5) business days after the Tribes' receipt of such notice, unless the Tribes consent to 
federal court jurisdiction within that time. 
(C) If the State refuses to consent to federal court jurisdiction 
with respect to any action brought by the Tribes to enforce the provisions of this 
Compact, the Tribes shall notify the Secretary of the Interior of that fact and shall mail a 
copy of such notice to the National Indian Gaming Commission and to the State. Unless 
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the State consents to federal court jurisdiction within five ( 5) days of receipt of such 
notice, the relief requested by the Tribes in its Complaint filed with the federal court shall 
be deemed granted and incorporated into this Compact as if fully set forth herein. 
(4) No Third Party Rights. Nothing herein shall be interpreted as 
providing standing to any person or entity other than the Tribes, the State, or the United 
States to bring an action for enforcement of the terms of this Compact. 
(5) Post Compact Meetings. The Tribes and the State agree to meet 
periodically as may be needed in an effort to enhance good relations and to facilitate the 
orderly operation of the matters addressed in this Compact 
19. Reservation of Rights Under the Act 
a. Status of Class II Gaming. Nothing in this Compact shall be deemed to 
affect the operation by the Tribes of any Class II gaming as defined in the Act, whether 
conducted within or without the Gaming facility or gaming facilities, or to confer upon 
the State any jurisdiction over such Class II gaming conducted by the Tribes. 
b. No Authorization to Tax. Except as provided in Section 14, nothing in this 
Compact shall be deemed to authorize the State or any political subdivision thereof to 
impose any tax, fee, charge or assessment upon the Tribes or the Gaming operation. 
Nothing in this Compact shall authorize or permit the collection and payment of any 
Idaho tax or contribution in lieu of taxes or fees on or measured by gaming transactions, 
gaming devices permitted under this Compact, gross or net Gaming revenues, or the 
Tribes' net income. Nothing in this Section is intended to affect the State's right to tax 
income as permitted by law. 
c. Preservation of Tribal Self-Government. Except as set forth in this 
Compact, nothing shall be deemed to authorize the State or any political subdivision 
thereof to regulate in any manner the government of the Tribes, including the Tribal 
Gaming Commission, or to interfere in any manner with the Tribes' selection of its 
government officers, including members of the Tribal Gaming Commission. 
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20. Operation of State Lottery 
The Idaho State Lottery, which includes Idaho State Lottery vendors, may operate 
within the Fort Hall Indian Reservation subject to the terms and conditions listed bel.ow: 
a. The Idaho State Lottery may operate only with the Tribes' permission, and 
the Tribes may rescind permission at the sole discretion of the Tribes; 
b. The Id3!10 State Lottery must honor any requirements or conditions that the 
Tribes may require; and 
c. The Tribes will provide the Idaho State Lottery thirty (30) days' written 
notice of any requirements, conditions, or withdrawal of pennission to operate in order to 
allow the Idaho State Lottery adequate time to fully comply with any Tribal requirements. 
21. Consent does not constitute a waiver 
Consent by either party to jurisdiction of the federal courts in any one action shall 
not constitute a waiver of future rights to assert a lack of jurisdiction in any other action. 
22. Severability 
Each provision, section and subsection of this Compact shall stand separate and 
independent of every other provision, section and subsection. In the event that a federal 
court finds any provision, section or subsection of this Compact to be invalid, the 
remaining provisions, sections and subsections of this Compact shall remain in full force 
and effect. 
23. Notices 
All notices required or authorized to be served under this Compact shall be served 
by certified mail, return receipt requested, by commercial overnight courier service or by 
personal delivery at the following addresses: 
State: State Gaming Agency 
c/o Director, Idaho State Lottery 
1199 Shoreline Lane, Suite 100 
Boise, ID 83702 
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Tribes: Chairman, Fort Hall Business Council 
Shoshone Bannock Tribes 
P.O. Box306 
Fort Hall, ID 83203 
And 
Chairman, Shoshone-Bannock Gaming Commission 
P.O. Box 1001 
Fort Hall, ID 83203 
24. Effective Date and Duration 
a. Effective Date. This Compact shall become effective upon execution by 
the Governor of the State and the Chairman of the Tribes, and upon certification by the 
Governor that the legislature has ratified the compact and authorized waiver of the State's 
Eleventh Amendment immunity, upon certification by the Tribal Chairman that the Tribes 
have adopted a resolution authorizing waiver of sovereign immunity and upon approved 
by the Secretary of the Interior and publication in the Federal Register pursuant to the 
Act. 
b. Renegotiation. The State and the Tribes may, by appropriate and lawful 
means, request negotiations to amend or replace this Compact. In the event of a request 
for renegotiation, this Compact shall remain in effect until renegotiated or replaced. Such 
requests shall be in writing and shall be sent by certified mail to the Governor of the State 
or the Chairman of the Tribes at the appropriate governmental office. 
c. Changes in Federal Law. In the event federal law regarding gaming on 
Indian Lands shall change, any provision of this Compact which may be inconsistent with 
such change shall be void only to the extent necessary to confo!1ll to said change. 
d. Games Conducted by Other Tribes in Idaho. In the event any oilier Indian 
tribe is permitted by compact or final court decision to conduct any Class ID -games in 
Idaho in addition to those games permitted by this Compact, this Compact shall be 
amended to permit the Tribes to conduct those same additional games. A final court 
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decision shall mean a final decision of a federal court or Idaho court once it is no longer 
capable of change by reconsideration, appeal, review or certiorari. 
25. Amendments 
This Compact cannot be amended except in writing by the State and the Tribes as 
provided in Section 23. 
26. Entire Agreement 
This Compact contains the entire agreement of the parties hereto with respect to 
the matters covered by this Compact and no other statement, agreement or promise made 
by any party, officer or agency of any party shall be valid or binding. The Tribes and the 
State shall not enter into any other compact affecting the Gaming operation, except as 
amended to this Compact as provided hereinabove. 
27. Governing Law 
This Compact shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of 
the United States. 
28. Triplicate Originals 
This Compact shall be executed in triplicate originals, one for each of the 
signatures. Each and all are equally valid. 
29. Authority to Execute 
Each of the undersigned represents that he or she is duly authorized and has the 
authority to execute this Compact on behalf of the party for whom he or she is signing. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Compact on the day and 
year set forth below. 
SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES 
By 
Dirk Kemp ~ 
Dated: February 18, 2000 Dated: February 18, 2000 
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ADDENDUMD 
SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES v. IDAHO, 
465 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2006) 
465 F.3d 1095 
465 F.3d 1095, 06 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9593 
(Cite as: 465 F.3d 1095) 
C 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Ninth Circuit. 
State ofrDAHO; [daho State Lottery, Defendants-
. cross-plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES, a federally rec-
ognized lndian Tribe; Fort Hall Business Council; 
Shoshone-Bannock Tribal Gaming Commission, 
Plaintiff-cross-defendants-Appellees. 
No. 04-35636. 
Argued and Submitted April 5, 2006. 
Filed Oct. 11, 2006. 
Background: Federally recognized Indian tribe 
brought declaratory judgment action against state, 
seeking determination as to types of games tribe 
could offer pursuant to tribal-state gaming compact. 
After consolidating action with similar action brought 
by state, the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Idaho, B. Lynn Winmill, J., granted summary 
judgment for tribe. State appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Canbv, Circuit 
Judge, held that: 
ill amendment of compact was required for tribe to 
be able to operate video gaming machines as a result 
of permitted operation of such games by other tribes 
in state; 
(ll amendment of compact to permit tribe to operate 
v_ideo gaming machines was mandatory, and did not 
reopen compact to renegotiation; and 
ill state statute imposing limitations on numbers of 
tribal video gaming machines and requiring tribes 
amending their gaming compacts to permit use of 
such machines to contribute to local educational pro-
grams and schools did not apply to tribe. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
ill Contracts 95 €=;>143(1) 
95 Contracts 
95ll Construction and Operation 
95ll(A) General Rules of Construction 
95kl43 Application to Contracts in General 
95kl4.J(1) k. In General. Most Cited 
Pagel 
Cases 
General principles of contract interpretation are ap-
plied to construe a contract governed by federal law. 
ill Indians 209 €=>337(3) 
209 lndians 
209IX Gaming 
209k333 Establishment and Regulation in 
General 
209k337 Other Gaming 
209k337(3) k. Tribal-State Compacts. 
Most Cited Cases · 
(Formerly 209k32(12)) 
As the more specific provision, provision of tribal-
state gaming compact indicating that compact was to 
be amended to pennit Indian tribe to conduct, along 
with those class lil games already permitted by com- · 
pact, any additional games that other tribes in state 
were permitted by compact or court decision to con-
duct was controlling over provision authorizing tribe 
to operate any gaming activity that state allowed any 
other person, organization, or entity to conduct, and 
therefore amendment of compact was required for 
tribe to be able to operate video gaming machines as 
a result of permitted operation of such games by 
other tribes in state. 
ill Indians 209 €=>334 
209 Indians 
2091X Gaming 
209k333 Establishment and Regulation in 
General 
209k3.l4 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 209k32(12)) 
An Indian tribe is an "entity" under the Indian Gam-
ing Regulatory Act (IGRA). Indian Gaming Regula-
tory Act,§ 2 et seq., 25 U.S.C.A. § 270 I et seq. 
J.11 Contracts 95 C=>t 56 
95 Contracts 
9511 Construction and Operation 
95Jl(A) General Rules of Construction 
95k 151 Language oflnstrument 
95kl56 k. General and Specific Words 
and Clauses. Most Cited Cases 
Specific terms of a contract govern inconsistent, 
more general terms. Restatement (Second) of Con-
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
465 F.3d 1095 
465 F.3d 1095, 06 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9593 
(Cite as: 465 F.3d I 095) 
tracts§ 203. 
ill Indians 209 €=337(3) 
209 Indians 
2091X Gaming 
209k333 Establishment and Regulation in 
General 
209k337 Other Gaming 
209k337(3) k. Tribal-State Compacts. 
Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 209k32(12)) 
Provision of tribal-state gaming compact indicating 
that compact was to be amended to permit Indian 
tribe to conduct, along with those class III games 
already permitted by compact, any additional games 
that other tribes were permitted by compact or court 
decision to conduct in state made amendment of 
compact mandatory, and did not reopen compact to 
renegotiation. 
J§J. Contracts 95 '€=147(2) 
9 5 Contracts 
9511 Construction and Operation 
95ll(A) General Rules of Construction 
95kl47 lntention of Parties 
95kl47(21 k. Language of Contract. 
Most Cited Cases 
Contracts 95 C=;,152 
9 5 Contracts 
221! Construction and Operation 
95ll(A) General Rules of Construction 
95k 15 l Language oflnstrument 
95ki52 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Contract terms are to be given their ordinary mean-
ing, and when the terms of a contract are clear the 
intent of the parties must be ascertained from the 'con-
tract itself. 
l1l Indians 209 €=337(3) 
209 lndians 
2091X Gaming 
209k33 l Establishment and Regulation in 
General 
209k337 Other Gaming 
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209k337(3l k. Tribal-State Compacts. 
Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 209k32(12)) 
State statute that imposed limitations on numbers of 
tribal video gaming machines and required tribes 
·amending their gaming compacts with state to permit 
use of such machines to contribute percentage of an-
nual net gaming income to local educational pro-
grams and schools did not apply to Indian tribe 
which, under terms of its compact with state was 
entitled to amendment of compact to permit its ~pera-
tion of video gaming machines as a result of permit-
ted operation of such games by other tribes in state, 
given that compact referred to games themselves, and 
not number of machines, and that compact prohibited 
state from imposing school payments on tribe's gam-
ing operation. I.C. §§ 67-429B( l ), 67-429C. 
*1096 Michael S. Gilmore, Deputy Attorney General, 
Bo!Se, JD, for the defendants-cross-plaintiffs-
appellants. 
Scott D. Crowell, Kirkland, WA, for the plaintiff-
cross-defendants-appellees. 
Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
District of Idaho; B. Lynn Winmill, District Judge 
Presiding. D.C. Nos. CV-01-00052-BLW, cv-01'. 
00171-BLW. 
Before: CANBY, GOULD, and BEA, Circuit Judges. 
CANBY, Circuit Judge: 
Idaho appeals the district court's grant of summary 
Judgment to the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes ("Tribes") 
fl!.l.· ·h' d I · m t e1r ec aratory Judgment action regarding the 
types of games they may offer pursuant to their 
tribal-state gaming Compact ("Compact") with 
fdaho. The court ruled that the Tribes could operate 
tribal video gaming machines without -renegotiating 
their Compact to limit the numbers of games and to 
require payments by the Tribes to local educational 
programs and schools. We affirm the district court's 
grant of summary judgment to the Tribes. 
FN 1. We refer to the Shoshone-Bannock 
Tribes by their plural name, but they consti-
tute a single federally recognized Indian 
tribe. 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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BACKGROUND 
A, The IGRA and the Tribes' Gaming Compact 
With Idaho 
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA") pro-
vides a comprehensive framework for regulating 
gaming on Indian land. See25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721. 
The IGRA divides tribal gaming into three classes: I, 
II and Ill. The parties agree that operation of the 
tribal video gaming machines at issue in this case 
constitutes class Ill gaming. Class III gaming may be 
conducted on Indian lands if it is: (1) authorized by 
the tribe seeking to conduct the gaming; (2) located 
in a State which does not bar such gaming; and (3) 
"conducted in conformance with a Tribal-State com-
pact entered into by the Indian tribe and the 
State .... "25 U.S.C. § 27I 0(d)(l). 
In 2000, the Tribes and Idaho entered into a gaming 
Compact. See65 Ped.Reg. 54541-03 (Sept. 8, 2000) 
(approval of the Compact by the Assistant Secretary 
of the Interior for Indian Affairs). The parties in-
tended the Compact to "govern the licensing, regula-
tion and operation of Class *1097 Ill gaming con-
ducted by the Tribes on Indian Lands located within 
[Idaho]." Compact § 3(k). The Compact authorizes 
the Tribes to conduct any class Ill gaming activity 
'~hat the State of Idaho 'permits for any purpose by 
any person, organization, or entity,' as the phrase is 
interpreted in the [IGRAJ." Compact § 4(a). Re-
markably, the Compact did not specify a limit on the 
numbers of gaming machines, nor did it specify a 
term of the Compact1s duration. 
When the Compact was negotiated, the Tribes and 
State could not agree on what types of class Ill games 
Idaho allowed others to conduct. Idaho's position was 
that "the electronic gaming currently conducted by 
the Tribes in Idaho is an imitation of casino games 
and prohibited under Idaho and federal law." The 
Tribes' position was that Idaho allowed all class Ill 
gaming except sports betting. 
Unable to compromise on the scope of permissible 
class Ill gaming, the parties agreed to seek a declara-
tory judgment to determine which class III games the 
Compact authorized. The Tribes and State each filed 
suit in the district court seeking declaratory relief. 
The court consolidated the cases into the present ac-
tion. 
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B. Proposition One 
While this case was pending in the district court, the 
voters of Idaho adopted an initiative called Proposi-
tion One that authorized Indian tribes to conduct 
gaming using "tribal video gaming machines." Sec-
tion Two of Proposition One stated that the Indiari 
tribes suffer from disproportionate unemployment 
and poverty and that recently tribes have "proceeded 
in good faith to make major investments in Indian 
gaming facilities, and [that] those facilities have fi-
nally enabled the tribes to reduce unemployment and 
welfare and improve living conditions on their reser-
vations." Proposition One informed voters about the 
disagreement between the tribes and Idaho regarding 
video gaming machines.T'N::! The voters approved 
Proposition One on November 5, 2002. 
FN2. Section Two of Proposition One pre-
sented the dispute as follows: 
Due to differences in opinion over the in-
terpretation ofldaho law, ... tribes face le-
gal uncertainties about the types of gam-
ing machines they can operate on Indian 
lands. · 
Attempts by the tribes and the governor to 
resolve these legal uncertainties have 
failed, jeopardizing the future of tribally-
funded education, health care, and social 
service programs. Therefore, the citizens 
of Idaho desire to secure the future of 
tribal gaming on Indian lands in Idaho 
themselves through this ballot measure. 
This ballot measure clarifies that it is the 
public policy of ... Idaho that Indian tribes 
can continue to operate the types of lot-
tery-style gaming machines currently used 
at Indian gaming facilities on Idaho reser-
vations under the terms of this act. 
Proposition One added two sections to the Idaho 
Code. 67-4298 and 67-429C. Section 429B allows 
"Indian tribes ... to conduct gaming using tribal video 
gaming machines pursuant to state-tribal gaming 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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compacts which specifically permit their use." Idaho 
Code§ 67-429B( 1 ). Section 429C authorizes tribes to 
amend their gaming compacts to permit the use of 
tribal video gaming machines. It also provides that 
the gaming machines authorized by such an amend-
ment are limited to the number currently operated by 
the affected tribe plus 25%, and that no annual in-
crease in numbers may exceed 5% of the number of 
gaming machines possessed on January 1, 2002. 
Idaho Code § 67-429C( J)(b). In addition, the statute 
provided that tribes adopting the prescribed amend-
ments agreed to contribute 5% of the annual net gam-
ing income to local educational programs and 
schools. Idaho Code§ 67-429Ci 1 )/c). 
* I 098 Shortly after Proposition One became law, the 
Coeur d'Alene, Kootenai, and Nez Perce Tribes em-
ployed the amendment procedure in Idaho Code sec-
tion 67-429C(2) to amend their compacts with Idaho 
by incorporating the terms of 67-429C(J). The 
amendments granted them the right to operate tribal 
video gaming machines, subject to the statute1s lim.i-
tations of numbers and requirements of school pay-
ments. 
C. District Court Ruling 
The voters1 approval of Proposition One narrowed the 
dispute before the district court by clarifying Idaho's 
public policy regarding tribal video gaming ma-
chines. The remaining issue before the district court 
was whether the existing Compact between the 
Tribes and Idaho must be renegotiated before the. 
Tribes could operate tribal video gaming machines. 
The court held that "the Compact does not require the 
Tribe[s] and the State of Idaho to enter into renego-
tiations before the Tribe[s are] authorized to conduct 
gaming using tribal video gaming .machines.'' Fur-
ther, the court ordered the parties to "adopt a brief 
written amendment clarifying that the Tribe is author-
ized to operate 'tribal video gaming machines1 as that 
term is defined in [Idaho Code) § 67-429ll." The 
court found "[t]hat the machines used by the Sho-
shone-Bannock Tribes in their gaming operation in 
May 2004 are tribal video gaming machines .... " 
DISCUSSION 
ill We review de novo a district court1s grant of 
summary judgment. Sie1ra Club r. Babbitt 65 F .3d 
1502, 1507 (9th Cir.1995 I, The Compact states that it 
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is to be "construed in accordance with the laws of the 
United States." Compact § 27. We apply general 
principles of contract interpretation to construe a con-
tract governed by federal law. See Kennewick Irri-
gation Dist. v. United States, 880 F.2d IO I 8. !032 
(9th Cir.1989). The parties here rely on Idaho con-
tract law, however, and we accept that practice be-
cause we discern, and the parties note, no difference 
between Idaho and federal contract law. 
I. Authorization of Tribal Video Gaming Ma-
chines 
ill The Compact has two, somewhat differing provi-
sions addressing the permissible scope of the Tribes' 
class Ill gaming. 
ill Section 4, "Authorized Class Ill Gaming," pro-
vides: 
[T)he Tribes may operate in its gaming facilities lo-
cated on Indian Lands, any gaming activity that the 
State of Idaho 'permits for any purposes by any per 
son, organizcition, or entity/ as the phrase is inter-
preted in [the !ORA). The Tribes may not operate 
any other form of Class Ill gaming activity. 
S~ction 24.d, "Games Conducted by Other Tribes," 
states: 
In the event any other Indian tribe is permitted by 
compact or final court decision to conduct any Class 
lll games in Idaho in addition to those games permit-
ted by this Compact, this Compact shall be amended 
to permit the Tribes to conduct those same additional 
games .... 
The plain language of section 4 authorizes the Tribes 
to operate video gaming machines because Idaho 
permits three other tribes to operate tribal video gam-
ing machines in the state. An l.ndian tribe is an "en-
tity" under the IGRA. Artichoke Joe's Cai. Grand 
Casino 1'. Norton. 353 F.3d 712, 73 I (9th Cir.2003) 
(interpreting 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(l)(ll)). The Coeur 
d'Alene, Kootenai, and the Nez Perce Tribes all le-
gally operate tribal video gaming machines lli\ in 
Idaho pursuant to *1099ldaho Code section 67-429B. 
If section 4 of the Compact stood alone, authorization 
of the Tribes to conduct video gaming would appear 
to be automatic, because section 4 does not mention 
any requirement ofan amendment of the Compact. 
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FN3. A tribal video gaming machine ... is 
not activated by a handle or lever, does not 
dispense coins, currency, tokens, or chips, 
and performs only the following functions: 
(a) Accepts currency or other representa-
tive of value to qualify a player to partici-
pate in one or more games; 
(b) Dispenses, at the player's request, a 
cash out ticket that has printed upon it the 
game identifier and the player's credit bal-
ance; 
(c) Shows on a video screen or other elec-
tronic display, rather than on a paper 
ticket, the results of each game played; 
(d) Shows on a video screen or other elec-
tronic display, in an area separate from the 
game results, the player1s credit balance; 
(e) Selects randomly, by computer, num-
bers or symbols to determine game re-
sults; and 
(f) Maintains the integrity of the opera-
tions of the terminaJ. 
Idaho Code§ 67-429B( ll. 
W The State relies, however, on section 24.d, which 
does contemplate an amendment to the Compact to 
permit gaming conducted by other tribes. We agree in 
part with the State: section 24.d is applicable here. 
Section 24.d is more specific in its apglication to 
gaming by other tribes than is section 4.J;; Specific 
terms of a contract govern inconsistent, more general 
terms. S. Cal. Gas Co. v. Cit}' of Santa Ana, 336 
F.3d 885, 891 /9th Cir.2003) (per curiam); see 
a/soRestatement (Second) of Contracts§ 203 /1981). 
We agree with the district court, therefore, that an 
amendment of the Tribes' Compact is required for the 
Tribes to be able to operate their video gaming ma-
chines as a result of the permitted operation of such 
games by other tribes in Idaho. 
FN4. The Tribes contend that section 24.d 
was added to the Compact only because it 
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was not clear at the time of the Compact1s 
negotiation tµat other Indian gaming was 
covered by section 4 as gaming Idaho per-
mitted "for any purposes by any person, or-
ganization or entity." Our subsequent deci-
sion in Jrlichoie Joe's. 353 F.3d at 731 
made clear that tribes were ;,entities" within 
the meaning of this language. According to 
the Tribes, that decision makes the auto-
matic provision of section 4 applicable here 
and section 24.d becomes surplusage. We 
agree with the district court, however, that 
we must interpret each section according to 
the intent of the parties when the two sec-
tions were negotiated. 
Lilifil We reject, however, the State's contention that 
section 24.d requires renegotiation of the Tribes1 
Compact in order to arrive at the necessary amend-
ment. Section 24.d provides that, when any other 
tribe is permitted by compact to conduct class Ill 
games not permitted by the Tribes' Compact, the 
Compact "shall be amended to penmit the Tribes to 
conduct those same additional games .... " (Emphasis 
added). This plain language leaves no room for nego-
tiation; it mandates an amendment to permit one 
thing-the operation of the same games conducted by 
other tribes under their compacts. Contract terms are 
to be given their ordinary meaning, and when the 
terms of a contract are clear, the intent of the parties 
must be ascertained from the contract itself. Hof 
Roach Studios. Inc. 1·. Richard F'einer & Co., 1-;:;z, 
896 F.2d 1542. 1549 (9th Cir.1990) (amended opin-
ion); Citv o(Jdaho Falls v. Home Jndem. Co. 126 
Idaho 604, 888 P.2d 383, 386 (1995). The ordinary 
meaning of section 24.d makes the amendment of the 
Compact mandatory and leaves nothing to negotiate. 
The other provisions of the Compact are consistent 
with our conclusion that section 24.d amendments are 
mandated and do not *II 00 reopen the Compact to 
renegotiation. These provisions contain no substan-
tive requirements for amendments. The procedure for 
amending the Compact is set forth in sections 23-25. 
Section 25 provides that the Compact can be 
amended only in writing by the State and the Tribes 
"as provided in Section 23. 1' Section 23 states that 
"all notices required or authorized to be served under 
this Compact shall be served" upon the Idaho State 
Gaming Agency and the Chairman of the Tribes' 
Business Council. Section 23 does not outline any 
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other amendment procedures. Section 24.b Ei'::il con-
cerns renegotiation and states that either Idaho or the 
Tribes may request renegotiation, but the Compact 
remains in effect until the renegotiation is complete 
or the Compact is replaced. 
FN5. Nothing in sections 24.a or 24.c is 
relevant to this dispute. 
The Compact contains no sunset provision and sets 
no expiration date for the Compact or any of its pro-
visions. Neither party can unilaterally terminate the 
Compact. Nothing in the Compact indicates that re-
negotiation is required before an amendment is 
adopted pursuant to section 24.d. If Idaho wanted to 
condition section 24.d amendments on renegotiating 
the Compact, it should have bargained for that term 
as it appears to have done with regard to section 
11,FM, Because the Compact is clear, we do not need 
to consider the other tribes1 gaming compacts to evi-
dence the intent of the parties to this Compact that a 
section 24.d arnendmerit does not require renegotia-
tion of the Compact. 
FN6. Section l l of the Compact is titled 
"Management Contracfl and provides that if 
"the Tribes choose to engage an outside 
management company, the Tribes and the 
State shall negotiate amendments to this 
Compact .... " (Emphasis added). 
II. The Limitations on Numbers of Gaming Ma-
chines and the School Payments in Idaho Code § 
67-42.9C Do Not Apply To The Tribes 
[Z] Idaho argues that section 24.d's language referring 
to the games permitted by other tribes1 compacts re-
quires that the amendment mandated by section 24.d 
include the limitations in Idaho Code § 67-429C be-
cause the other Idaho tribes have amended their gam-
ing compacts to include those limitations. FN7 
FN7. The other tribes have assented to 
Proposition One's recommended terms re-
quiring tribes that operate video gaming ma-
chines to: (I) limit the number of the ma-
chines to 5% annual growth and 25% de-
cennial growth from a January 1, 2002 base-
line; and (2) require the tribes to contribute 
5% of their annual net gaming income to lo-
cal educational programs on or near the res-
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ervation. Seeldaho Code § 67-429C(l)(b)-
(£). 
Specifically, Idaho asks this Court to define "those 
same additional games" in section 24.d to include the 
limitations. on numbers of gaming machines and the 
requirement of school payments that the other tribes 
have adopted in return· for authorization to operate 
video gaming machines. 
We reject the State's contention that a limitation on 
the number of gaming machines necessarily inheres 
in the Compact's language entitling the Tribes "to 
conduct those same additional games.'' The plain 
meaning of ''same additional games1' refers to the 
games themselves and not the number of machines. 
The Idaho Code itself reflects this distinction. A 
tribal video gaming machine is defined by its operat-
ing mechanism. See Idaho Code § 67-429B1 I). No 
quantity restriction is included in the term "tribal 
video gaming machine," Instead, the statute's quan-
tity and growth restrictions on tribal video gaming 
machines, proposed for amended compacts, are lo-
cated in a different*II0I section from the one used to 
define the gaming machines. Compare§ 67c429B 
(defining tribal video gaming machines) with§ 67-
429C(l)(b) (recommending that tribes adopt a quan-
tity and annual growth restriction on the number of 
tribal video gaming machines). Thus, the state statu-
tory scheme buttresses the conclusion that is apparent 
from the words of section 24.d of the Compact itself: 
the Compact provides that the Tribes will be permit-
ted (by mandatory amendment) to conduct the games 
permitted other tribes. The ordinary meaning of 
"games" does not encompass a limitation on numbers 
or of increases in numbers of gaming machines. 
The quantity and growth restrictions on tribal video 
gaming machines to which the other tribes became 
subject were not unilaterally imposed on those tribes. 
Section 67-429C provided that tribes with existing 
contracts "maf' amend their compacts in the manner 
offered by the statute. The other tribes agreed to ac-
cept the statutory package of amendments in return 
for benefits offered by those amendments that were 
not included in their existing compacts. The Sho-
shone-Bannock Tribes) however, did not agree to 
amend their Compact and chose instead to rely on 
their Compacts existing provisions to confer the nec-
essary pennission to operate the video gaming ma-
chines. This the Tribes were entitled to do, and they 
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may not be subjected to the number limitations of the 
state statutory package that would have applied had 
the Tribes agreed to amend under section 67-429C. 
The fact that the Tribes may now be in a technically 
better position than the other tribes is purely a func-
tion of the terms of the Compact that Idaho and the 
Tribes voluntarily entered into. 
The Tribes1 case is even stronger with regard to the 
payments to educational programs and schools. As 
with the limitation on numbers of machines, there is 
no justification for reading a school payment re-
quirement into the plain meaning of "additional 
games." But in addition, section 19 of the Compact 
prohibits Idaho from imposing its desired school 
payments on the Tribes' gaming operation. Section 
19.b bars the State from "impos[ing] any tax, fee, 
charge or assessment upon the Tribes or the Gaming 
operation." It prohibits Idaho from collecting, and 
the Tribes from paying, "any Idaho tax or contribu-
tion in lieu of taxes or fees on or measured by gaming 
transactions, gaming devices permitted under this 
Compact, gross or net Gaming revenues, or the 
Tribes' net income," Idaho's desire to impose a re-
quirement of educational and school payments on the 
Tribes1 video gaming operations is a "tax or contribu-
tion" that is "measured by ... net Gaming revenues." 
Thus, section 19.b precludes interpreting section 
24.d's 1'same additional games" language to authorize 
unilateral imposition of school payments · on the 
Tribes. 
It is true that the prohibition on taxation in section 
19.b echoes a similar prohibition in the IGRA. See25 
U.S.C. § 2710(d)(41. It is also true that, despite this 
statutory prohibition, states and tribes have negoti-
ated compacts that provided for payments by the 
tri.bes to the states. See, e.g., in re l'ndian Gaming 
Related Cases, 331 F.3d 1094, 1111-14 (9th 
Cir.2003). The theory on which such payments were 
allowed, however, was that the parties negotiated a 
bargain permitting such payments in return for mean-
ingful concessions from the state (such as a conferred 
monopoly or other benefits). See id. Although the 
state did not have authority to exact such payments, it 
could bargain to receive them in exchange for a quid 
pro quo conferred in the compact. See id 
Nothing of the sort has occurred here. The Compact 
as negotiated between the *1102 Tribes and Idaho 
retained the proh.ibition against taxes or payments in 
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section 19.d, and the Tribes did not bargain away 
their immunity from such taxes or payments in the 
Compact. The fact that other tribes have accepted a 
package of benefits and burdens when they voluntar-
ily amended their compacts does not change the 
terms of the Compact between the Tribes and Idaho. 
That Compact prohibits the imposition of the pay-
ments that Idaho would now require. 
CONCLUSION 
The Tribes are entitled to a mandatory amendment of 
the Compact stating that they are authorized to con-
duct tribal video gaming, as the other tribes have 
been permitted to do. The limitations on numbers of 
machines and the requirement of educational pay-
ments set forth in Idaho Code section 67-429C do not 
apply to the Tribes or their gaming operation. Al-
though Idaho may seek to renegotiate the Compact 
under section 23 at any time, it may not force the 
Tribes to the negotiating table or unilaterally termi-
nate the Compact. The Tribes are fully authorized to 
use tribal video gaming machines free from the re-
quirements of Idaho Code section 67-429C unless the 
Tribes agree to a renegotiated or replacement Com-
pact that contains those restrictions. The district 
court"s judgment accordingly is 
AFFIRMED. 
C.A.9 (ldaho),2006. 
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